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THEY CAN'T DO THAT, CAN THEY? TORT
REFORM VIA RULE 23
Richard L. Marcust
In 1988 the New York Times reported that class actions appeared to
be "dying."' The article explained that, since the heyday of the class
action in the 1970s, "use of the courts as a vehicle of social change has
subsided."2 As a consequence, the Reporter of the Advisory Commit-
tee on the Civil Rules explained, "class actions had their day in the sun
and kind of petered out."3
Careful readers of the Times must therefore have been surprised
by the recent resurgence of class actions into the headlines, a resur-
gence occasioned by the massive settlements of two personal injury
cases, one involving asbestos victims and the other involving recipients
of breast implants.4 Whether or not the asbestos future claims and
silicone gel class action settlements may properly be viewed as public
law litigation,5 the attention focused on their settlements certainly
t Professor of Law, Hastings College of the Law, University of California. I should
mention that during the Summer of 1990 1 served as a consultant to the Center for Claims
Resolution with regard to developments in asbestos litigation occurring at that time.
Although the CCR had no role in the preparation of this Article, I am indebted to a
number of people for help with it. Mike Green carefully reviewed a draft and provided
extensive and extremely helpful comments and criticisms. Tom Rowe and DavidJung also
read and commented on a draft, and participants in a work-in-progress session at Hastings
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1 Douglas Martin, The Rise and Fall of the ClassAction Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES,Jan. 8, 1988,
at B7.
2 Id.
3 Id. (quoting Paul D. Carrington).
4 The breast implant settlement was announced by the Times in a front-page story
that characterized it as "the largest settlement ever negotiated in a class-action lawsuit."
Gina Kolata, 3 Companies in Landmark Accord on Lawsuits Over Breast Implants, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 24, 1994, at Al. The story explained that it was "at least twice as large as the largest
previous class-action agreement, which involved workers with asbestos." Id at B10. The
Times initially announced the asbestos agreement the day after it was filed in a story sug-
gesting that class actions "may serve as a model for averting tens of thousands of personal-
injury lawsuits involving asbestos." Michael deCourcy Hinds, Asbestos Settlement is Proposed
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1993, at 35. The paper continued to report the passage of that settle-
ment through the settlement approval process. See Asbestos Settlement Cleared, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 18, 1994, at D5; A Hearing on Asbestos Settlement, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1994, at D3.
5 See Richard L. Marcus, Public Law Litigation and Legal Scholarship, 21 U. MicH. J.L
REF. 647, 671-75 (1988) (suggesting similarities between some aspects of product liability
litigation and public law litigation). But see Linda Mullenix, Mass Tort as Public Law Litiga-
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should give the general public the impression that the class action is
not dead. Indeed, a significant proportion of the public may have to
decide whether to opt out of the alternative claims processes that
these settlements create if they wish to preserve their right to sue in
court. This fact makes it evident that the class action has landed like a
600-pound gorilla in the arena of tort reform, where there has of late
been increasing interest in replacing tort litigation with scheduled
benefits like those provided in these class action settlements. One re-
action to using class actions to accomplish this reform might be:
"They can't do that, can they?"
This Article reflects on that question and answers it with a quali-
fied yes. The starting point is an appreciation of the strands of sub-
stantive tort reform that have characterized federal judges' reactions
to mass tort litigation, sketched in Part I. Part II connects these
strands to features of three recently-confected class action settlement
packages, for these agreements seem to respond to the criticisms
judges have levelled at tort law in mass tort litigation. Turning to the
question whether Rule 23 can be employed to effectuate tort reform
of this sort, Part III considers three grounds for categorically rejecting
such power-Erie's limitations on the law-making power of the federal
courts, the problem of unmatured claims, and the challenge of giving
notice. It concludes that these serious obstacles probably do not abso-
lutely preclude an undertaking of this sort, provided there is a genu-
ine opportunity to opt out. But that conclusion says nothing about
when this power should be exercised, or about the actual contours of
such a class action. Part IV therefore explores other serious obstacles
to using this authority and identifies a number of grounds for great
uneasiness with what was actually done in the recent settlements. Nev-
ertheless, Part V expresses guarded confidence about the ultimate
consequences of the recent settlements. This forgiving attitude is
based on the fact that the recent settlements deal with exceptional
litigation problems, that they may offer a good deal to some claimants,
and that they afford an opportunity for experimentation in tort
reform.
I
THE SUBSTANTIVE UNDERCURRENT IN FEDERAL MASS TORT
LmGATION
Almost from the beginning, we have known that the distinction
between substance and procedure can be as elusive as it is critical.6
tion: Paradigm Misplaced; 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 579, 580-81 (1994) (rejecting analogy between
mass tort litigation and public law litigation).
6 "'[S]ubstance' and 'procedure' are the same key-words to very different problems.
Neither 'substance' nor 'procedure' represents the same invariants. Each implies different
19951
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But at least some heartland should be solid; ever since Erie7 it has been
clear as a statutory, and probably constitutional, matter that federal
judges cannot develop their own preferred tort law regime or refuse
to apply state law because they feel it would lead to unwise results. In
Erie itself, there was thus no room to argue on remand from the
Supreme Court's decision that the district court could have refused to
apply Pennsylvania's rule limiting the duty of care to "trespassers" on
the ground that it represented an archaic attitude. Nevertheless, as
Justice Reed observed in his concurring opinion in Erie, "no one
doubts federal power over procedure."8 The problems since Erie have
therefore dealt with the nether area between substance and proce-
dure, and in this area the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure could con-
trol matters to which they apply.9 Because of the scope and
importance of the procedural tools authorized by those rules (includ-
ing the class action), one must proceed with great caution in declar-
ing that certain maneuvers go beyond the pale.
Nevertheless, one need not read very far between the lines to find
a substantive impulse underlying the federal courts' handling of mass
tort litigation, and, in particular, class action innovations developed to
cope with it. In some ways this development may have been inevita-
ble, since class actions offered a theoretical model for solving some
vexing problems of substantive tort law.' 0 Other developments in tort
law, such as the idea that a court could order "medical monitoring" of
persons exposed to a risk,'" seemed to invite class action treatment
because the monitoring could easily be contemplated en masse. But
more aggressive judges sought to move beyond such facilitation.
Early on the class action figured as an important cog in such tort
reform efforts. The first major instance was in 1981, when Judge
Spencer Williams certified a nationwide punitive damages class action
in Dalkon Shield litigation.' 2 Having presided over a jury trial that
took nine weeks, the judge convened a series of meetings to "discuss
variables depending upon the particular problem for which it is used." Guaranty Trust Co.
v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945).
7 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
8 Id. at 92 (Reed, J., concurring).
9 See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471-74 (1965).
10 See David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law"
Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARv. L. REv. 849 (1984) (proposing class action treatment as a
method of solving problems of proving causation).
11 See, e.g., In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 849-52 (3d Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 499 U.S. 961 (1991); Hagerty v. L & L Marine Serv., Inc., 788 F.2d 315, 319-20 (5th
Cir. 1986); Ayers v. Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 297-316 (N.J. 1987); see also Melissa M. Thomp-
son, Comment, Enhanced Risk of Disease Claims: Limiting Recovery to Compensation forLoss, Not
Chance, 72 N.C. L. REv. 453 (1994).
12 In re Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prod. Liab. Litig., 521 F. Supp.
1188 (N.D. Cal. 1981), vacated, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1171
(1983).
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methods for achieving economies of time and expense in the trial of
these actions," 13 surely a laudable goal well within the procedural
realm. But he also ordered briefing on class certification even though
no party favored that treatment,' 4 and certified a mandatory nation-
wide class on punitive damages issues.
Judge Williams justified this action with a number of forceful ar-
guments about the "unconscionable possibility that large numbers of
plaintiffs who are not first in line at the courthouse door will be de-
prived of a practical means of redress."' 5 Because there is no "right"
to punitive damages, he reasoned, in mass tort situations the prospect
that the till will be emptied by punitive awards makes them particu-
larly pernicious. Since "[t]he purpose of punitive damages is to sting,
not kill, a defendant," the judge concluded that "[c ] ommon sense dic-
tates that a defendant should not be subjected to multiple civil pun-
ishment for a single act or unified course of conduct which causes
injury to multiple plaintiffs.' 6
There is much to be said for Judge Williams's concerns. The
question whether repeated punitive damage awards should be allowed
in product liability cases is highly controversial.'7 If there is a signifi-
cant risk that a defendant's assets would be exhausted by punitive
damages "windfalls" for early plaintiffs, leaving later plaintiffs without
recourse, action surely seems warranted.' 8 But the problem for a fed-
eral court confronting this risk is the same as the core problem in
Erie-whether to displace this rule of state law because the rule has
bad effects. Judge Williams invoked the due process clause as one
justification for his action,19 but he cited no due process authority and
his argument sounded more like common lawmaking than constitu-
tional reasoning. The federal constitutional issues remain beclouded
today,20 and state courts have reportedly begun to rely on arguments
13 Id. at 1191.
14 Id. A.H. Robins Co., the main defendant, decided to support the judge's class certi-
fication order on appeal, but had not been converted to the wisdom of this course until
after the judge acted.
15 In re Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prod. Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp.
887, 898 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
16 Id. at 899, 900.
17 E.g., David G. Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages Against Manufacturers of
Defective Products, 49 U. CHi. L. Ray. 1, 46 n.216, 50, 52 (1982).
18 However, Judge Williams may have seriously underestimated the amount of money
available to pay damages. See infra text accompanying note 110.
19 526 F. Supp. at 899-900.
20 See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993) (uphold-
ing punitive damages award 526 times as large as compensatory award in face of substan-
tive due process argument); Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991)
(upholding punitive award four times as large as compensatory award while noting that
this "may be close to the line"); cf. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331 (1994)
(invalidating Oregon's prohibition on postverdict review of punitive award by court on due
process grounds). The Court has granted certiorari to consider due process limitations on
19951
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like Judge Williams's to limit punitive damages claims as a matter of
state law. 2 '
Judge Williams's effort to use Rule 23 to preempt "unwise" state
law was problematic but prophetic. For a variety of reasons, the Ninth
Circuit reversed the class certification on the ground that the judge
had overreached. 22 In response, Judge Williams wrote an article la-
menting the possible demise of the mass tort class action and forecast-
ing that "until Congress addresses these questions by enacting
comprehensive federal products liability law ... the inequities and
shortcomings of the present system require that we judges work in an
innovative fashion."23
Whether it was a prescription or merely a prediction, Judge Wil-
liams's forecast proved true. Asbestos litigation has been the prime
area in which federal judges have used innovation to achieve essen-
tially substantive goals. A frontal assault on state law occurred in 1985,
albeit not in a class action.24 Judge Rubin urged the Fifth Circuit to
adopt federal common law principles in asbestos cases to guard
against two evils. The first was the risk cited by Judge Williams in
Dalkon Shield-that repeated awards of punitive damages would not
only add no deterrent effect to the enormous compensatory liability
borne by asbestos producers but would also create a risk that later
plaintiffs would receive nothing. Moreover, added Judge Rubin, fed-
eral common law would correct "the inequity resulting from the fact
that some states do not permit such awards."2
The second evil, according to Judge Rubin, resulted from the will-
ingness of some states to recognize claims for those exposed to asbes-
tos, despite the absence of current disabling symptoms. Those who
exhibited signs of exposure to asbestos such as pleural thickening
could sue immediately for the risk of developing worse conditions
even though they might never suffer a more serious condition. In
Judge Rubin's view, this sort of suit would further deplete the assets
available to pay those who actually developed serious conditions.26
punitive awards in BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 646 So. 2d 619 (Ala. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S.
Ct. 932 (1995).
21 Sheila L. Birnbaum & J. Russell Jackson, Since TXO, State Courts are Relying on
Grounds Other Than Federal Due Process to Limit or Modify Punitive Damages Schemes, NAT'L LJ.,
Mar. 14, 1994, at B4 ("State courts are relying on grounds other than federal due process
to limit or modify their existing punitive damages schemes.").
22 In re Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prod. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d 847
(9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983).
23 Spencer Williams, Mass Tort Class Actions: Going, Going, Gone?, 98 F.R.D. 323, 325
(1982).
24 Jackson v.Johns-Manvile Corp., 750 F.2d 1314 (5th Cir. 1985). The case was filed
as a class action but was not certified as one.
25 Id. at 1332 (Rubin, J., concurring).
26 Judge Rubin stated:
[Vol. 80:858
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Like Judge Williams's concerns about punitive damages, Judge
Rubin's doubts about the wisdom of allowing "risk of cancer" claims
have much to commend them. Perhaps juries are too prone to credit
the risk of catastrophic events such as the development of cancer.
More significantly, making pleural thickening actionable might start
the statute of limitations running and preclude a later suit for a more
serious condition if one should actually develop, although state law
could avoid this result 27 Thus, such a regime might not only confer a
"windfall" on those who never suffer harm but also deny or minimize
a recovery for those who ultimately develop serious conditions. De-
spite these arguments, the Fifth Circuit ruled en banc that the requi-
sites for promulgating federal common law were not present.28
Ironically, because many cases were filed in federal court or re-
moved, much of the law on asbestos personal injury claims has been
made by federal courts.2 9 Under Erie, however, these courts were not
free to fashion law as they saw fit, and federal judges continued to
grind their teeth about state law in asbestos cases. In 1986, the Third
Circuit found it necessary to overturn a mandatory class action in a
suit regarding the cost of removing asbestos from schools, although
the case did continue as an opt-out class action.30 Citing "an unparal-
If a plaintiff who does not have asbestos related cancer is allowed to recover
for cancer damage because he finds a medical witness who will opine that
there is a reasonable probability that he may later develop the disease, that
individual's damage award will be a windfall if the disease never material-
izes. That windfall may leave later plaintiffs unable to secure compensation
for diseases actually suffered .... Such claims must mature only as each
disease is diagnosed so that each plaintiff may bring separate claims based
on facts, not speculation, and receive proper compensation.
Id. (RubinJ., concurring).
27 In various states, courts have found that the later filing of a suit for cancer is not
barred by an earlier recovery for asbestosis, in part to avoid the conundrum that would
otherwise exist for plaintiffs. SeeJackson v.Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 727 F.2d 506, 519-
22 (5th Cir. 1984) (applying Mississippi law); Eagle-Picher Indus. v. Cox, 481 So. 2d 517,
520-21 (Fla. App. 1985). In settled cases, however, the shift away from the single judgment
rule may not be significant; a release will accomplish the same thing. For example, in
approving the Philadelphia future claims asbestos class action settlement, the judge noted
that in over 90% of the cases settled by the participating defendants, the plaintiffs gave
"'full' releases, whereby the claimant releases all claims for any future asbestos-related in-
jury, including cancer." Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.RD. 246, 284 (E.D. Pa.
1994).
28 See 750 F.2d at 1323-27. For an argument favoring the use of federal common law,
see Georgene M. Vairo, Multi-Tort Cases: CauseforMoreDarkness on the Subject, or A New Role
for Federal Common Law, 54 FoRDAm L. Rnv. 167 (1985). Defendants were not the only
ones to ask the federal courts to develop federal common law in asbestos litigation. See
Blackston v. Shook & Fletcher Insulation Co., 764 F.2d 1480, 1486 (1lth Cir. 1985) (refus-
ing to adopt federal common law rule of rebuttable presumption of exposure, as requested
by plaintiff).
29 I am indebted to Mike Green for this point.
3o In re School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 852
(1986).
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leled situation in American tort law,"3' the court lambasted the aura
of the gaming table found in "uneven, inconsistent and unjust awards"
which flowed in part from the presence of suits for pleural thicken-
ing.3 2 The court foresaw no real prospect that state courts or legisla-
tures would meaningfully address these problems. Instead, they
would probably act in "a parochial and near-sighted manner" because
any state attempting to "impose some equitable form of apportion-
ment to claims presently pending and to those inevitably arising in the
future" would be frustrated since other states would not be so enlight-
ened.33 The court explained that "[a] forum wishing to take the long-
range view might find that its efforts were not only ineffective but un-
fair to its citizenry because claimants in the other states could drain
off all the assets available for satisfaction of claims."34
In the Summer of 1990, similar concerns about the long-term fi-
nancial viability of defendants in asbestos litigation prompted several
judges to initiate possible class action proceedings to solve the asbes-
tos problem. After meeting together, this ad hoc group divided up
the asbestos world in hopes of averting more bankruptcies.3 5 Ulti-
mately, the effort was scotched by the Sixth Circuit, which held that
these judges did not have jurisdiction to do what they were doing.36
Substantive considerations came to the fore in 1991 in the Report
of the Judicial Conference Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos Litigation,
appointed by ChiefJustice Rehnquist in 1990. After surveying the dif-
ficulties wrought by asbestos litigation and noting that "this litigation
impasse cannot be broken except by aggregate or class proceed-
ings,"37 the Committee recommended that Congress create "a na-
31 Id. at 1000.
32 Id. at 1001. The court quoted the lament of a Philadelphia state court judge:
Results ofjury verdicts are capricious and uncertain. Sick people and peo-
ple who died a terrible death from asbestos are being turned away from the
courts, while people with minimal injuries who may never suffer severe as-
bestos disease are being awarded hundreds of thousands of dollars, and
even in excess of a million dollars. The asbestos litigation often resembles
the casinos 60 miles east of Philadelphia, more than a courtroom
procedure.
Id. (quoting THE RAND CORP., ASBESTOS IN THE COURT (1985)).
33 789 F.2d at 1001.
34 Id.
35 See Stephen Labaton, 10 Federal Judges Agree on Plan to Consolidate Asbestos Lawsuits,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1990, at 1 (describing "unusual agreement [reached after] a rare
private meeting [of judges that] would bring about a way for compensating more than
100,000 asbestos victims that is more uniform, less costly and quicker than the present way
of adjudicating cases").
36 In re Allied-Signal Corp., 915 F.2d 190, 191 (6th Cir. 1990) ("This panel acknowl-
edges and strongly reaffirms this basic principle of limited jurisdiction and is unable to
find any congressional authority for an 'ad hoc national coordinating committee' to issue
orders as an Article Ill court.").
37 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S. AD Hoc COMM. ON ASBESTOS LITIG., REPORT OF
AD Hoc COMM. ON ASBEsTos LrrT. 19 (1991).
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tional system for resolving asbestos claims which at the very least
permits consolidating all asbestos claims in a single forum."3 8 It urged
that such a scheme be employed to "ensure uniform consistent recov-
ery to claimants"3 9 and that special attention be given to areas of tort
law such as punitive damages40 and development of recovery tables to
determine levels of compensation.4 ' The Committee noted that some
judges had created "inactive dockets" that permitted suits to be filed
at the first sign of injury, but held inactive until the onset of disability,
if that occurred.42 The Committee also suggested that Congress make
provision for dealing with disease progression. 43 As a fallback in case
this "ultimate solution"" was not adopted, the Committee recom-
mended that Congress expressly authorize class actions or collective
trials in asbestos cases.45 Failing such measures, the Committee fore-
saw the bankruptcy of all or most available defendants. 46
It is unclear whether there was a genuine hope that Congress
would act, but that surely did not happen, and the federal judiciary
did not wait long for a legislative solution. Eight judges with large
asbestos caseloads asked the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
to transfer all federal asbestos personal injury cases to a single judge,
or to otherwise use its transfer powers to combine the cases.47 The
Panel, despite having already refused five previous transfer requests, 48
decided that the magnitude of the litigation had reached a point that
justified transfer, and it therefore ordered the transfer of some 26,000
cases. It also endorsed "a new, streamlined approach,"49 mentioning
the risk of further bankruptcies and the threat of insufficient funds to
compensate all injured parties due, in part, to punitive damage
38 Id. at 30.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 32-33.
41 Id. at 34.
42 Id. at 25.
43 Id. at 34.
44 Id. at 3.
45 Id. at 36. One member of the Committee,Judge Thomas F. Hogan, dissented from
this part of the Report. See id. at 41-43.
46 The Report stated that
The committee believes it to be inevitable that, unless Congress acts to for-
mulate a national solution, with the present rate of dissipation of the funds
of defendant producers due to transaction costs, large verdicts, and multi-
ple punitive damage awards, all resources for payment of these claims will
be exhausted in a few years.
Id at 27.
47 In reAsbestos Prod. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 771 F. Supp. 415, 417 (J.P.M.L. 1991).
48 Id. at 417-18. The Panel explained that only the first refusal to transfer in 1977
offered detailed analysis of the issues presented, such as unanimous opposition by the par-
ties, the advanced stage of some of the actions, and the importance of individual questions.
The later refusals, in 1980, 1986, and 1987, were more limited in their analysis.
49 Id. at 418.
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awards.50 Overall, the Panel's goal was to create a single comprehen-
sive direction for this litigation.
What emerges from this survey is a picture of federal mass tort
litigation plagued by a number of pressure points that most properly
are labelled "substantive"-the availability of punitive damages, the in-
flux of present claims for the threat of suffering serious harms in the
future, the complications caused by proof regarding causation, and
the risk of ever-increasing bankruptcies. What also emerges is a pic-
ture of federal judges convinced that the states were immobilized in
dealing with these issues. Whether or not these circumstances re-
sulted from a "failure of political will,"51 that impasse is likely to con-
tinue. What was needed was a method to solve these problems. Enter
Rule 23.
II
CLAss ACTIONs BREAK THE GRIDLOCK
As even the general press has divined, the recent future claims
class action settlements seem ideally suited to solve the substantive
problems which have plagued the federal courts in mass tort litiga-
tion. Indeed, that is one of the themes of those who confected the
settlements. Perhaps Rule 23 can serve as the Final Solution to the
problem of mass torts. There is no precise formula for this solution,
however, and a number of the variables might be modified without
upsetting the overall scheme. Accordingly, it is worthwhile to survey
the features of the recent experiments to see their tort reform aspects.
Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc.52 was a package deal from the
outset. It was filed as a class action on January 15, 1993 with a pre-
arranged and extremely detailed settlement agreement. The deal it-
self seems to have emerged in part from meetings sponsored by the
50 Id. at 422.
51 Cf. Linda Mullenix, Federalizing Choice ofL wforMass-Tort Litigation, 70 TEx. L. REv.
1623, 1630 (1992) (asserting that the American Law Institute's Complex Litigation Project
suffered from a "failure of political will" in its handling of choice of law in mass tort cases);
see also Linda Mullenix, Complex Litigation and Article lIJurisdiction, 59 FoanRDm L. REv.
169, 197 (1990) (arguing that expansion of federal subject matter jurisdiction to accom-
modate mass torts is insufficient to accomplish the desired objective unless "accompanied
by a substantive tort law provision or a federal common law of mass torts"). Professor
Mullenix explained:
Ultimately, the problem is not a theoretical one at all: it is political. Stated
simply, the reformers do not wish to pay the price of true complex litigation
reform, which is to federalize both the problem and the solution. The re-
formers are willing to pay ritual lip service to the federal nature of the prob-
lem . . .but are not willing to commit to a federalized substantive-law
solution to this problem.
Id. at 222.
52 157 F.R.D. 246 (E. D. Pa. 1994).
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Federal Judicial Center.53 Pursuant to the deal, the class was defined
to include all persons exposed in the workplace to asbestos products
of any of the twenty asbestos producers who are members of the
Center for Claims Resolution (CCR), an organization these defend-
ants formed to coordinate litigation of asbestos cases. The class defi-
nition obligingly excluded all persons who had lawsuits pending as of
the date on which Georgine was filed,54 but the case was designed to
bind all other potential workplace claimants.55 From the perspective
of these defendants, the objective was dear-to put an end to their
involvement in asbestos litigation by cutting off new filings and ob-
taining a discharge of all claims in return for a structured payment
scheme.
The class action accomplishes this result by shunting all future
claimants into a claim review process managed directly by the CCR.
This process, in turn, was modeled on its experience in handling
thousands of litigated cases over the years of the CCR's existence. In
order to qualify for compensation, a claimant has to show a compensa-
ble medical condition and occupational exposure to asbestos products
of a member of the CCR- This simplified proof process would stream-
line the causation problem and jettison a number of defense issues
that formerly consumed a great deal of trial time.
The stipulated settlement agreement spells out very specific med-
ical criteria for qualification. 56 Those who do not satisfy these crite-
ria-most notably persons who might have claims for pleural
53 Id. at 264.
54 The CCR's stated objective with regard to these claims was to settle them within five
years. See Stipulation for Settlement Between the Class of Claimants and Defendants Rep-
resented by the Center for Claims Resolution, Jan. 15, 1993, at 3, Georgine v. Amchem
Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246 (E.D. Pa. 1994) [hereinafter Settlement Agreement].
55 The class did not include claims by persons exposed to asbestos products outside
the workplace.
56 For example, consider the definition in § V.B.4.d of the Settlement Agreement,
supra note 54, of whether bilateral pleural thickening warrants compensation. Compensa-
tion is allowed only if X-rays show that the thickening includes "blunting of at least one
costophrenic angle," and if it is not explained by any other condition in the subject's his-
tory, has not been followed within two years by malignancy, and:
i. If the bilateral pleural thickening is, in the opinion of a Certified B-
reader, of ILO Grade B2 or greater, then Pulmonary Function Testing that,
in the opinion of a Board-certified Internist or Pulmonary Specialist, shows:
(1) If TLC is available, TLC < 75% of predicted; or
(2) If TLC is not available, a VC or FVC < 75% of predicted with FEV-
1/FVC > (actual value); and in either case
(3) a statement by a Board-certified Internist or Pulmonary Specialist
that the asbestos-related changes are a substantial contributing factor
in causing the pulmonary function changes; or
ii. If the bilateral pleural thickening is, in the opinion of a Certified B-
reader, of ILO Grade C2 or greater, then Pulmonary Function Testing that,
in the opinion of a Board-Certified Internist or pulmonary Specialist,
shows:
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thickening which are not compensable under the agreement-will
not be eligible for current compensation. Those who do exhibit qual-
ifying conditions may elect either a "simplified payment procedure"
set at the minimum value of the schedule attached to the agree-
ment,57 or they may submit evidence to the CCR to be evaluated ac-
cording to "traditional tort principles"58 within the range of
compensation amounts specified by the agreement. In addition, the
agreement provides for review of claims asserted to be "extraordi-
nary," in that they would truly stand out if litigated, and such claims
are not limited to the compensation schedule applicable to the
others.59 A claimant who rejects the amount offered by the CCR may
sue for damages in court. The suit is limited, however, to the ques-
tions addressed in the claims proceeding-whether the claimant was
exposed to a CCR defendant's asbestos in the workplace, whether the
claimant has an asbestos-related condition that is compensable under
the agreement, and the amount of compensation. No punitive dam-
ages are allowed, and only a very small proportion of claims can pro-
ceed to litigation in any given year.60
The agreement also provides limits to ensure the financial viabil-
ity of the compensation program. Overall, the CCR compensation
proposals are to fall within specified dollar averages for each year and
each disease category. Furthermore, the number of claims paid in
each category in any given year is limited, so those who fail to make
the cut in one year must wait until the following year.
(1) FVC < 80% of predicted with FEV-1/FVC > 75% (actual value), or,
if the individual tested is at least 68 years old at the time of the testing,
with FEV-I/FVC > 65% (actual value); or
(2) TLC < 80% of predicted; and in either case
(3) a statement by the Board-Certified Internist or Pulmonary Special-
ist that the asbestos-related changes are a substantial contributing fac-
tor in causing the pulmonary function changes.
57 Exhibit B to the Settlement Agreement, supra note 54, provides the following Com-
pensation Schedule:
Negotiated
Compensable Minimum Average Maximum
Medical Category Value Value Range Value
Mesothelioma 20,000 37,000-60,000 200,000
Lung Cancer 10,000 19,000-30,000 86,000
Other Cancer 5,000 9,500-12,000 32,000
Non-Malignant 2,500 5,800-7,500 30,000
58 Id. § VIII.B.2.
59 There are also special provisions for claims involving extreme financial hardship or
other exigent circumstances. See id. § XI.
60 See id. § X.
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The settlement in Lindsey v. Dow Coming Corp.,61 the silicone gel
implant case, displays some similarities but also shows pertinent differ-
ences. It was not a package deal negotiated by class counsel selected
by the defendants. Rather, it was negotiated by five attorneys depu-
tized by the court to represent the class. The agreement defines the
class to include all recipients of silicone gel implants produced by the
participating defendants, including those with suits pending. It dis-
charges participating defendants from future liability to class mem-
bers so long as they make specific scheduled payments to the funds it
creates. Among other things, these payments finance a Disease Com-
pensation Program that provides compensation according to a speci-
fied schedule. The disease definitions specified in the agreement are
much less precise than those used in the CCR asbestos case. The
agreement also disallows punitive damages. 62 This compensation pro-
gram is to be operated by a Claims Administrator who may in turn
hire claims officers.63 To be eligible, claimants have to register by a
stated deadline. The Agreement also provides a series of funds to pro-
vide benefits to those not presently eligible for compensation from
the Disease Compensation Program for such things as medical-diag-
nostic evaluation, explanation, and rupture.64 The fiscal integrity de-
vice under this agreement is reduction of benefits rather than a delay
in payment, and as a trade-off, class members are to be accorded a
second opportunity to opt out should reduction be found necessary.65
Ahearn v. Fibreboard Corp., 66 a third recent effort to use a Rule 23
settlement to solve problems of mass tort litigation, has not received
the publicity accorded the two cases profiled above. It presents an
even more complicated picture. The driving force behind this settle-
ment of all future personal injury claims against Fibreboard was a dis-
pute between Fibreboard and two of its insurers that was the subject of
substantial litigation in the California courts. With the encourage-
ment of Judge Robert Parker, Fibreboard, the insurers, and leading
plaintiffs' attorneys were able to negotiate a series of interlocking
agreements to settle all potential future claims against Fibreboard. 67
61 In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., CV92-P-10000-S, GV-94-P-1158-
S, MDL No. 926, 1994 WL 578353 (N.D. Ala. 1994).
62 Breast Implant Litigation Settlement Agreement § 11.0, In re Silicone Gel Breast
Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., CV92-P-10000-S, GV94-P-1158-S, MDL No. 926 (N.D. Ala. 1994)
(No. GV-92-P-10000-S).
63 Id. § IV.A.
64 Id. § III.C.1.
65 Id.
66 No. 6:93GVS26 (E.D. Tex. 1993).
67 The agreements include not only a settlement between Fibreboard and its insurers
and a class action settlement between the class of future asbestos claimants and Fibreboard
but also a settlement of a class action against third party claimants, such as other asbestos
companies who might assert claims against Fibreboard and its insurers. The underlying
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These agreements specify that the insurers will pay over $1.5 billion
into a trust which would process and pay claims by class members.68
Based on the limited independent financial ability of Fibreboard it-
self,69 Judge Parker certified for settlement purposes a mandatory
Rule 23(b) (1) (B) class of all persons who had not yet sued on the
date the agreement was announced. Under the agreement, class
members may file claims with the trust, which will offer compensation
based on historical settlement values for the amount of the claimant's
harm attributable to Fibreboard products. Compensation is available
for five categories of conditions, including pleural thickening. There
is no schedule of benefits, although the maximum compensation for
any one person's exposure is $500,000. Claimants who reject the offer
from the trust may sue it eventually, but only after completing media-
tion, nonbinding arbitration, and a mandatory settlement conference
by a judge or special master. If a claimant does sue, he or she may
seek neither punitive damages, nor compensation in excess of
Fibreboard's share of responsibility, nor any compensation for the risk
of contracting cancer, nor any amount greater than $500,000. The
notice materials predict that there will be sufficient funds to pay all
claims, but there are also "spendthrift" provisions that limit payments
in any given year.
These agreements are intricate and convoluted; unravelling them
is reminiscent of sorting out the Internal Revenue Code. But the cen-
tral point for our purposes is that they implement an alternative to the
tort system that is responsive to the federal courts' substantive con-
cerns about mass torts. Thus, they (1) abolish punitive damages; (2)
abolish or curtail claims for fear of future harm; (3) substantially sim-
plify issues of causation with regard to individual claims; (4) adopt
categorical compensation formats to even out amounts of compensa-
tory payments; (5) provide for further compensation for actual wors-
ening of conditions (rather than a present payment for risk that worse
things might follow); and (6) cap or define the tort litigation costs for
defendants.70 In these respects, they resemble compensation schemes
devised by Congress such as the federal Black Lung program.71 It has
goal seems to be to obtain "total peace" for the insurers, who are putting up almost all of
the money to fund the claims program.
68 Fibreboard itself is to pay $10 million into the trust.
69 Disregarding asbestos liabilities, Fibreboard would reportedly have a net worth of
approximately $200 million. See Notice of Class Action, Settlement and Third-Party Claim-
ant Class Settlement and Hearing at 18, Ahearn v. Fibreboard Corp., No. 6:93cvS26 (E.D.
Tex. July 29, 1994).
70 This is not to say that these agreements only have "substantive" characteristics. For
example, items (3) and (4) also serve to reduce costs. But in any customary Erie categoriza-
tion, these features would be classified as "substantive."
71 The Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-945 (1988). This Act creates a bene-
fits program for miners afflicted with pneumoconiosis, and facilitates recovery with statu-
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not been a secret that the agreements have a substantive impact on
tort law-the parties discuss it openly.7 2 The question is whether, and
how, the courts can use Rule 23 to do this.
tory presumptions regarding causation. See generally Robert L. Ramsey & Robert
Habermanns, The Federal Black Lung Program-The View From the Top, 87 W. VA. L. Rzv. 575
(1985). Some members of Congress objected to the passage of the Act as "an intrusion by
the Federal Government into the field of workmen's compensation.., a foot in the door,
a possible first step towards the ultimate federalization of the entire system of workmen's
compensation." H.R. REP. No. 563, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 13, 83 (1969) (minority
views).
72 For example, in Georgine the proponents of the settlement offered the following
critique of the existing tort scheme and their reasons for favoring their solution:
[I]n the current tort system, an individual who has been exposed to asbes-
tos and who exhibits even minor x-ray changes must generally file suit
promptly or face the bar of the statute of limitations. Having filed suit,
most claimants accept a modest settlement for their pleural claims and re-
lease their right to sue for more serious later-developing diseases. In other
words, plaintiffs in the tort system often compromise their future claims on
a prospective basis, without knowing the full extent of their damages. The
choice that the proposed settlement affords the plaintiffs here is less risky,
because it provides for compensation based on what actually happens in
the future, and thus does not require the class members to compromise
their claims for insufficient amounts prematurely.
Memorandum in Support of the Joint Motion of the Settling Parties for Approval of Notice
to the Class, Aug. 16, 1998, at 50, Carlough v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 158 F.R.D. 314 (E.D.
Pa. 1993) (No. 93-CV-0215).
Appearing as amicus curiae, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania stressed the "crisis"
in asbestos litigation and endorsed the settlement as "an important first step toward solving
this crisis... through an efficient administrative mechanism." Brief Amicus Curiae of the
Attorney General of Pennsylvania on Fairness and Notice to the Plaintiff Class at 2-3,
Carlough v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 158 F.R.D. 314 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (No. 93-CV-0215). The
Commonwealth went on to invoke the Ad Hoc Committee Report, supra text accompany-
ing notes 37-46, and observe that "[a]lthough Congress has failed to act on these recom-
mendations, the proposed settlement is largely responsive to their substance." Id. at 4.
The point was not lost on the opponents of the deal. Thus, objectors asserted that
"[t]he obvious purpose of this class action is to require persons who sustain asbestos-re-
lated injuries in the future to resolve their claims against the CCR defendants through the
alternative dispute resolution system privately negotiated by counsel for CCR and self-ap-
pointed class counsel, rather than through the tort system." Wiese Parties' Memorandum
of Law in Opposition to the Settling Parties.Joint Motion for Approval of the Notice to the
Class at 3, Carlough v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 158 F.R.D. 314 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (No. 93-CV-
0215). Similarly, 37 law professors who signed an amicus brief raising ethical issues (which
was not accepted by the court) observed that "counsel have yielded to the temptation to
reform the substantive law by aiding some class members at the expense of others." Brief
of Law Teachers as Amicus Curiae at 10, Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246
(E.D. Pa. 1993) (No. 93-CV-0215).
The judge appears to have understood the point. Thus, when he approved the class
notice he reasoned that "[w]hat the settlement offers to [future] claimants is simply an
option to choose a different compensation system in the event they become ill." Carlough
v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 158 F.R.D. 314, 336 (E.D. Pa. 1993). In approving the settlement,
judge Reed found that "It]he primary purpose of the settlement talks in the consolidated
MDL litigation was to craft a national settlement that would provide an alternative resolu-
tion mechanism for asbestos claims." Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246
(E.D. Pa. 1994).
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III
POSSIBLE CATEGORICAL OBSTACLES
A simple reaction to these developments is to conclude that
courts absolutely cannot do what these cases propose to accomplish.
As a reporter asked, "Can a court really do this? Isn't it just legisla-
tion?"7 3 By their own near admission, the federal courts have resorted
to these expedients in asbestos litigation because Congress has not
acted. Three obvious obstacles to such judicial action are considered
here. Although an in-depth analysis of these obstacles is beyond the
scope of this Article, it does appear that they could be surmounted
even if they have not successfully been overcome in these particular
cases.
A. The Erie Problem
Describing these settlements as tort reform highlights an infre-
quently discussed Erie problem. Certainly the recent history chroni-
cled above indicates that Rule 23 is effecting, on a case-by-case basis,
what Congress has not done, and that Congress could cry foul. 74
There is a strong argument that Rule 23 provides no warrant for this
sort ofjudicial activism. As all are aware, in regard to Rule 23(b) (3),
the Advisory Committee Notes accompanying the 1966 amendments
assured that class actions should not ordinarily be used even in single
accident cases. 75 In the words of the leading treatise on federal prac-
tice, "allowing a class action to be brought in a mass tort situation is
clearly contrary to the intent of the draftsmen of the rule."76
Although some of those involved in the drafting of the 1966 amend-
ments have since experienced an epiphany concerning the desirability
of mass tort class actions, 77 it is hard to see how that change of heart
should alter the Erie and Rules Enabling Act issues. As noted below, 78
73 Roger Parloff, The Tort That Ate the Constitution, Am. LAw., July/Aug. 1994, at 75.
Interestingly, Ronald Motley, one of the attorneys who negotiated the CCR settlement,
criticized a 1992 proposal for legislation with provisions somewhat similar to the CCR set-
tlement on the ground that it would deprive plaintiffs of their constitutional rights to alter
their accrued rights through legislation. Ronald L. Motley & Susan Nial, A Critical Analysis
of the Brickman Administrative Proposak Who Declared War on Asbestos Victims' Rights?, 13 CAR-
Dozo L. REv. 1919, 1944 (1992).
74 Cf Owen M. Fiss, The Allure of Individualisn, 78 IowA L. REv. 965, 967 (1993) ("Con-
gress should have the last word when it comes to construing the Rules, for they are promul-
gated pursuant to a congressional statute and obtain whatever authority they possess from
that statute.").
75 See FED. R. Cir. P. 23 advisory committee's note (1966).
76 7B CHARLES ALAN WRiuHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1783, at 76
(2d ed. 1986).
77 See RICHARD L. MARcus & EDWARD F. SHERMAN, COMPLEX LITIGATION: CASES AND
MATERIALS ON ADVANCED CIVIL PROCEDURE 384 (2d ed. 1992) (quoting Prof. Charles Alan
Wright and Judge Jack Weinstein).
78 See infra part II.C.
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this problem can be solved, and may have already been resolved in the
recent cases, by genuine consent to the settlement regime. Absent
such consent, however, these arrangements appear to violate basic Erie
principles.
Until recently, the substance-procedure distinction in the class ac-
tion context focused on fitting the substantive law into the class action
mold, an effort that became necessary because attention to individual
circumstances came at a cost and the class action mechanism put a
premium on simplification and blending. Problems of causation and
damages have long posed puzzles in this regard. For example, in
adopting the fraud on the market theory to eliminate individual proof
of reliance,7 9 and in endorsing use of a rescissory rather than a conse-
quential damages measure in a securities fraud class action in order to
facilitate treatment as a class action, the Ninth Circuit rebuffed chal-
lenges based on the Rules Enabling Act.80 Similarly, the courts grap-
pled with the propriety of generalized proof of impact in antitrust
class actions.8' Such tensions led Judge Weinstein to warn in 1973
that in class actions there might be "a subtle erosion of substantive
law... A substantive change may be desirable on policy ground,...
but it is, it seems to me, quite unwise to slip into important changes in
substantive law on the happenstance that a suit is brought by a class
rather than by an individual claimant."8 2
These misgivings must be stronger when state law dictates the
substantive rules that govern an action. In the securities class action
mentioned above, the Ninth Circuit was able to deflect Enabling Act
criticism by pointing out that the courts themselves had given birth to
the private securities fraud action, so that they could alter those stan-
dards.83 Whenever state law dictates the rule of decision, Erie's consti-
tutional predicate stands as an obstacle to modifying substantive law to
79 The theory assumes that, when misleading statements are disseminated into a well-
developed impersonal market, the market will rely on them. Accordingly, it makes proof
of individual reliance unnecessary. The theory was endorsed by the Supreme Court in
Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). Legislation pending before Congress may alter
the fraud on the market theory. See Securities Litigation Reform Act, H.R. 1058 § 4, 104th
Cong., 1st Sess.
80 See Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 908 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816
(1976).
81 See, e.g., Windham v. American Brands, 565 F.2d 59 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 968 (1978) (concluding that to allow class action in this antitrust action would alter
substantive law and would violate the Rules Enabling Act).
82 SeeJack B. Weinstein, Some Reflections on the "Abusiveness" of Class Actions, 58 F.R.D.
299, 301-02 (1973).
83 The Court explained that, "[i]ndeed, we could, in the exercise of our Article III
jurisdiction, transform the lOb-5 suit from its present private compensatory mold by predi-
cating liability to purchasers solely on the materiality of a misrepresentation (i.e., economic
damage) regardless of transactional causation, without implicating the Enabling Act limita-
tion." Blackie, 524 F.2d at 908 n.24.
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facilitate class action treatment. As the Third Circuit recognized in
overturning a mandatory class certification, "the dictates of state law
may not be buried under the vast expanse of a federal class action.
The parties' rights under state substantive law must be respected, and
if that is not possible in a class action, then that procedure may not be
used."84 The Fifth Circuit emphasized this theme in rejecting Judge
Parker's initial method of trying an asbestos class action in 1990, con-
cluding thatJudge Parker's approach would contravene "the very cul-
ture of the jury trial":
Texas has made its policy choices in its substantive tort rules
against the backdrop of a trial. Trials can vary greatly in their proce-
dures, such as numbers of jurors, the method of jury instruction,
and a large number of other ways. There is a point, however, where
cumulative changes in procedure work a change in the very charac-
ter of a trial.... We do not suggest that procedure becomes sub-
stance whenever outcomes are changed. Rather, we suggest that
changes in substantive duty can come dressed as a change in
procedure.8 5
This decision is difficult to square with another Fifth Circuit deci-
sion,86 but the opinion's basic point is an important if indistinct cau-
tion against excessive judicial tinkering with state law.
84 In re School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1007 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 852
(1986).
In the same vein, the Seventh Circuit recently granted a writ of mandate overturning a
class certification designed to permit a nationwide class action for hemophiliacs suffering
from AIDS due to blood transfusions. In part the appellate court granted the writ because
the district court proposed to instruct the jury on an amalgam "consensus" tort law to
enable the case to proceed as a class action. Writing for the courtJudge Posner character-
ized this as an "Esperanto instruction, merging the negligence standards of the 50 states"
and explained:
The diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts is, after Erie, designed
merely to provide an alternative forum for the litigation of state-law claims,
not an alternative system of substantive law for diversity cases.... No one
doubts that Congress could constitutionally prescribe a uniform standard of
liability for manufacturers of blood solids. It might, we suppose, promul-
gate pertinent provisions of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. The point
of Erie is that Article III of the Constitution does not empower the federal
courts to create such a regime for diversity cases.
In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995).
85 In reFibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706, 711 (5th Cir. 1990).
86 In Rosales v. Honda Motor Co., 726 F.2d 259 (5th Cir. 1984), the plaintiff objected
to the bifurcation of liability and damages, citing Texas cases that refused to sever the
issues on the ground that they "are elements of an indivisible cause of action and may not
be tried piecemeal." Id. at 261 (quoting Eubanks v. Winn, 420 S.W.2d 698, 701 (Tex.
1967)). In an opinion byJudge Higginbotham (the author of In re Fibreboard Corp., 893
F.2d 706, 711 (5th Cir. 1990)), the court rejected the argument. The court stated:
The provision for separate trial of separate issues, including those of liabil-
ity and damages in personal injury suits, does not.., implicate [a] primar-
ily substantive, as opposed to procedural rule, either because affecting
"'people's conduct at the stage of primary private activity,'" or as concern-
ing "'a right granted for one or more non-procedural reasons, for some
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The recent settlements reflect a telling shift in the Erie issue that
should strengthen limitations on the federal courts' freedom of ac-
tion. Until now, the streamlining that has accompanied class treat-
ment has been just that; Judge Parker was trying to find an expedient
way to provide an overload of plaintiffs with some semblance of a trial.
The Fifth Circuit had assented to other class action innovations the
judge devised to achieve that goal in another case,8 7 and on remand
from the 1990 decision, the judge devised a more elaborate plan to
use statistical inference as a substitute for individual trials.88 If the
depiction of the recent mass tort class actions set forth above is cor-
rect, however, courts are going far beyond mere streamlining. They
are making changing the substantive law a prime objective of the ar-
rangement, with the class action serving as the vehicle.89 Now the cart
is, to a large extent, pulling the horse.
Even where the federal courts might have authority to effect such
transformation in nonfederal substantive law, they properly tread
lightly. Thus, the Third Circuit recently declined, in its role as
supreme arbiter of the law of the Virgin Islands, to cap punitive dam-
ages in asbestos cases:
We do not disagree with the concerns that have been expressed
about punitive damages awards, particularly in the asbestos cases.
We differ instead with those who would have the judiciary resolve
the conflicting policy arguments. We refrain from adopting such an
activist role on what is essentially a policy matter.90
Using class actions, the recent settlements have enabled the federal
courts to rush in where the Third Circuit feared to tread.
Some judges attempt tojustify such a revision of tort law by invok-
ing a residue of "equitable jurisdiction." They argue that this reserve
of authority empowers them to accomplish desirable ends like tort re-
form in response to pressing problems like those presented in mass
tort litigation. Thus, when he insisted that the parties address possible
purpose or purposes not having to do with the fairness or efficiency of the
litigation process.'" Rather, at best, a rule authorizing or prohibiting a bi-
furcated trial of liability-damage issues falls "within the uncertain area be-
tween substance and procedure" and is "rationally capable of classification
as either."
Id. at 262 (quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460,472 (1965) and 19 WRIGH- -r AL, supra
note 76, § 4509, at 144-45).
87 SeeJenkins v. Raymark Indus., 782 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1986).
88 See Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. Tex. 1990) (describing
plan). After the revised trial plan was announced, defendants again sought a writ of man-
date, but a different panel of the Fifth Circuit denied the position. See In re Fibreboard
Corp., No. 90-4199 (5th Cir. Mar. 29, 1990) (unpublished order).
89' Whether or not the federal judges involved in these cases favor the substantive
changes wrought, it seems obvious that the defendants do and that the class action is the
tool that effects the change.
90 Dunn v. Hovic, 1 F.3d 1371, 1387 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 650 (1993).
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class certification in the Dalkon Shield litigation and then imposed it
over the opposition of all concerned, Judge Williams explained that
he had "inherent power" to "certify a class when such a decision is in
the collective best interest of the plaintiffs."91 This power came, he
reasoned, from "the court's equitable jurisdiction over bills of
peace," 92 a power that was not "limited" by the federal rules.93 In a
thoughtful 1991 article, Judge Weinstein reflected on the implications
of such "equitable jurisdiction," particularly as embodied in the Bank-
ruptcy Act, to extract courts from the mass tort labyrinth.9 4 He asked
whether federal courts should, in mass tort situations, "strip the state
courts of their historic role in developing tort law"95 and concluded
that "[i]f the courts are to be the instrument of compensation.., we
cannot hope to apply the usual tort standards of liability and causa-
tion."96 This approach contrasts interestingly with his earlier concern
about a "subtle erosion of substantive law" in class actions,9 7 as the
more recent impulse toward tort law innovation seems neither subtle
nor a mere erosion.
Although "inherent power" may exist as an ill-defined penumbra
in limited areas,98 there is no credible source of equitable authority
for such a reformation of state tort law.99 Whatever ancient power the
courts had to invoke the bill of peace, that history hardly augments
the authority conferred by Rule 23. Nearly thirty years ago, the
Supreme Court announced that "federal interpleader was not in-
91 In re Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prod. Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp.
887, 895 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
92 Id. at 894.
93 See id. at 895 ("[T]he federal rules ... were not intended to limit the pre-existing
jurisdiction of the federal courts.").
94 Jack B. Weinstein & Eileen B. Hershenov, The Effect of Equity on Mass Tot Law, 1991
U. Ii- L. Ry. 269, 302-16.
95 Id. at 303.
96 Id. at 306.
97 See supra text accompanying note 82.
98 See Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991) (discussing the courts' inherent
power to sanction abusive litigation behavior).
99 RecentlyJudge Weinstein has employed a contrasting approach that draws on state
law. In In rejoint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., Nos. 90-3973 (E.D.N.Y.), 90-7518 (S.D.N.Y.),
1995 WL 21615 (E. & S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 1995), he approved a class action settlement that
revised rights with regard to the trust created to handle claims against Manville Corpora-
tion for personal injury due to exposure to asbestos. Finding an imminent shortfall in the
trusts's assets, he drew upon "the power to act equitably to protect all those claimants
against the trust who were injured by Manville asbestos," but he did not draw on federal
sources for that power. Instead, he looked to "the substantive power of NewYork courts-
and thus of federal courts acting as state courts under Erie." Id. at *33. Because New York
had "received" English law, he found himself able to draw on English sources to support
exercize of this "equitablejurisdiction." As he put it, "no statute or decision [of New York
law] limits the courts' equity powers to interpret New York substantive trust law. Acting as
New York courts, the Federal Courts must protect the rights of trust beneficiaries." Id. at
*50.
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tended to serve the function of a 'bill of peace' in the context of mul-
tiparty litigation arising out of a mass tort."00 The contemporaneous
adoption of amendments to Rule 23, which were ordinarily not even
to apply to mass accidents according to the Advisory Committee
Notes, hardly conferred such authority on the courts. Yet the "equita-
ble jurisdiction" argument posits that the courts already had this "bill
of peace" authority. As a basis for the abrogation of state tort law,
such "equitable principles" might reverse Erie whenever they invite a
more enlightened view (as would seemingly have been the case in Erie
itself). For the same reasons that the Fifth Circuit refused to adopt a
federal common law of torts to achieve "justice" in asbestos cases,' 01
this assumption of inherent power must ultimately fail.
Within the text of Rule 23, the courts have fastened on Rule
23(b) (1) (B) for authority. 0 2 This is the justification, for example, for
Judge Parker's mandatory class action in Fibreboard. But this provision
offers little support for the sort of law reform the courts are undertak-
ing. Its application to mass torts relies upon a gloss on a gloss. The
first gloss is the comment in the Advisory Committee Notes that
(b) (1) (B) class treatment might be appropriate in a suit involving a
limited fund.103 The second gloss is that the limited fund concept
embraces the situation in which a defendant's assets might not suffice
to cover all claims to be asserted in future suits (not this one). This
justification was also invoked by Judge Williams in 1981 in the Dalkon
Shield litigation, 04 and it has been invoked several times since then,
100 State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 537 (1967).
101 InJackson v.Johns-ManvilIe Sales Corp., 750 F.2d 1314 (5th Cir. 1985) (en banc),
ceart. denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986), the court explained:
It could be argued that federal courts have an institutional interest in main-
taining a federal judicial system that is fundamentally "just." While we are
sympathetic to such an argument, it is clear that such an abstract, all-en-
compassing interest cannot form a sufficient basis upon which to rest the
displacement of state law. First, we find implicit in Erie the idea that in
diversity actions federal court concerns in ajust judicial system cannot be
used as a reason for supplanting substantive state policies. Second, cer-
tainly as a practical matter, the effect of resting assertions of federal judicial
power on so vague an interest as "justice" would be to eviscerate Erie com-
pletely and thus ignore its constitutional underpinnings.
Id. at 1325-26.
102 Fed. K Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B) authorizes a class action to avoid a risk that "adjudica-
tions with respect to individual members of the class which would as a practical matter be
dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudication or substan-
tially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests."
103 In various situations an adjudication as to one or more members of the
class will necessarily or probably have an adverse practical effect on the in-
terests of other members who should therefore be represented in the law-
suit. This is plainly the case when claims are made by numerous persons
against a fund insufficient to satisfy all claims.
FED. K. Civ. P. 23(b) (1) (B) advisory committee's note (1966).
104 See Dalkon Shiel4 526 F. Supp. at 893-98.
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although rarely surviving appellate review. 105 For the law reformer,
this justification has the attractiveness (beyond mandatory class certifi-
cation) of inviting something resembling a bankruptcy cram-down to
cope with the expected shortfall of assets.
Whatever its viability in other cases, the limited fund concept
does not work well in mass tort litigation. Whether there is a limited
fund might present either a legal or a factual question. Certainly
there could be situations in which there is a finite legal limit to the
fund available to satisfy claims. For example, interpleader can involve
such situations as insurance policies, where the policy places a dollar
limit on recovery. The law may similarly impose a monetary limit on
aggregate recoveries, such as the Price-Anderson Act's $560 million
cap on damages in connection with certain nuclear accidents.' 0 6 But
there is no such legally imposed cap pertinent to mass tort situations.
The closest analogy would be a constitutional limitation on repeated
punitive damages awards or a common-law limitation that accom-
plished the same thing, but there is presently no such limitation.
Only by the sleight of hand of assuming the desired substantive re-
sult-a punitive damages cap-can the federal court find such a lim-
ited fund as a matter of law. 107
There remains, then, the possibility that the fund may be limited
as a matter of fact. In 1981 Judge Williams was persuaded that such a
risk existed regarding Dalkon Shield claims because the A.H. Robins
Company faced over 1,500 suits nationwide seeking compensatory
damages totaling in excess of $500 million and punitive damages in
excess of $2.3 billion while Robins's net worth was, the judge under-
stood, some $280 million. 08 Although on its face this seems persua-
sive, in reality the question is much more complicated.
To begin with the prospective liabilities, toting up the sum of the
prayers for relief seems unwarranted. There is no reason to assume
that, if one plaintiff is successful in suing Robins, all other plaintiffs
will necessarily be successful.' 0 9 Differences in factual circumstances
and applicable principles of state law regarding liability make that un-
105 See, e.g., In rejoint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 14 F.3d 726 (2d Cir. 1993); In re
School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 852 (1986); In re
Bendectin Prods. Liab. Litig., 749 F.2d 300 (6th Cir. 1984); In reFederal Skywalk Cases, 680
F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.), cert. denied; 459 U.S. 988 (1982).
106 Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 170, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1988 & Supp. V
1993).
107 See, e.g., Dalkon Shield, 526 F. Supp. at 898-900 (arguing that common sense shows
there must be a limitation on punitive damages in mass tort cases).
108 Id. at 893.
109 Of course, offensive use of collateral estoppel might make this prediction appropri-
ate, but given the fact that defendants ordinarily win some cases, along with the differences
among plaintiffs and state laws, it is unlikely that the issues will be identical in different
cases, or that it would be considered fair to apply collateral estoppel.
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likely. Therefore, the cumulation of the claims made in all suits is
unwarranted. Moreover, even if one could assume all plaintiffs would
be successful, assessing the true value of the suits by the prayer, partic-
ularly as to punitive damages, is even more dubious. Plaintiff lawyers
are notoriously and understandably generous in their prayers for re-
lief, and these should not be taken as reliable indicators of probable
recovery. Although detailed data on actual results of tried cases (and
perhaps settled cases as well) might provide some meaningful indica-
tion of likely future recoveries, one would still need to take account as
well of the severity of individual injuries. Thus, the actual computa-
tion of prospective liability is extremely difficult.
Turning to the assets side of the ledger, the question is much
more complicated than obtaining a simple net worth figure from the
defendant's books. Regarding the Dalkon Shield litigation, we cannot
be blind to the fact that, some six years later, bankruptcy proceedings
led to the sale of the company and the creation of a fund of $2.475
billion for claimants, an amount seemingly sufficient to satisfy even
the inflated liabilities in Judge Williams's worst case scenario. 110
Moreover, it is critical to take account of other sources of payment
including insurance and co-defendants. As a consequence of the
eventual sale of the company, Messrs. Robins Sr. and Jr., heads of the
firm, received $385 million and were granted indemnity against fur-
ther claims."' Absent that indemnity, they could have been viable
targets for suits and seem to exemplify the additional defendant possi-
bility. Perhaps the remarkable circumstances confronting Judge
Parker in Fibreboardjustified finding a limited fund there." 2 In most
cases, though, it will probably be impossible to factor in the possibility
that claimants unable to recover from one defendant would be able to
collect from other, more economically vibrant, entities. 113
Beyond these difficulties in determining whether the limited
fund concept actually applies, there are further challenges for the
court seeking to employ Rule 23(b) (1) (B) in a mass tort case because
110 See RIcHARD B. SOBOL, BENDING THE LAvW THE STORY OF DALKON SHIELD BANK-
RuPTcy 198-208 (1991). RegardingJudge Williams's view, see supra text accompanying note
108.
111 Id. at 333-34.
112 See supra text accompanying notes 66-69. The insurance companies reportedly re-
fused to settle on the terms provided unless there was a mandatory class action, thus argua-
bly creating a limited fund not otherwise available. But Fibreboard had successfully
litigated against the insurance companies in the California courts, and the insurance com-
panies' willingness to pay would not always be up to them.
113 It should be noted that this argument does not address the possibility of a claim for
contribution by these other defendants against the financially weak entity. Though this
might support the conclusion that there is actually a limited fund, it also compounds the
problem of assuring that all affected persons are before the court, discussed infra pp. 124-
25.
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of the diversity of prospective claimants to the defendant's assets. If
the class action is truly to adjust all claims to the defendant's limited
assets, then all claimants must presumably be included. By definition,
however, the class action does not do this. At best, a class action em-
phasizes that many creditors of an entity-often called the "involun-
tary creditors"-base their claims on events with a factual link. Others
(trade creditors and the like) do not, but they presumably have an
equal pro rata claim on the net assets of the entity, perhaps even a
secured claim. Moreover, some involuntary creditors do not share
common questions of fact with the voluntary creditors. Consider, for
example, someone injured by an A.H. Robins truck who is suing for
damages. As the Third Circuit discovered in In re School Asbestos Litiga-
tion,114 it may not be possible to include all asbestos tort claimants in
one class action. In Rule 19 terms, the limited fund theory would call
for the inclusion of all claimants, whatever the source of their claims.
Most fundamentally, Rule 23(b) (1) (B) simply does not prescribe.
any standards for resolving competing claims to the limited fund, if
one is found to exist.115 One animating objective for the class certifi-
cations in mass tort cases has been to subordinate punitive damages
claims to compensatory damages claims. In some circumstances, the
Bankruptcy Act may authorize a court to do this, 116 but Rule 23 pro-
vides no similar warrant for doing so. This difficulty explains the at-
tractiveness of the concept of "equitable jurisdiction," since that
invites some rough justice. The reality is that the Bankruptcy Act pro-
vides a statutorily-established method for dealing with actual inade-
quate assets cases, sometimes permitting a cram-down that overrides
substantive rights created by state law. As the Second Circuit recently
put it in rejecting an aggressive invocation of Rule 23(b) (1) (B) to ac-
complish a similar objective, "the function of the federal courts is not
114 789 F.2d 996, 1005-07 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 852 (1986) (holding the class
incomplete because it included only claimants seeking damages for the cost of removing
asbestos from schools, but excluded personal injury claimants and claimants who incurred
costs removing asbestos from other structures).
115 The closest thing to a standard is the suggestion in the advisory committee notes
that in limited fund cases "[a] class action by or against representative members to settle
the validity of the claims as a whole, or in groups, followed by separate proof of the amount
of each valid claim and proportionate distribution of the fund, meets the problem." Advi-
sory Committee Notes, 39 F.R.D. 69, 101 (1966). It is quite a stretch to find in this passage
authority for a federal court to develop its own rules about what should be treated as a
"valid" claim if that issue ordinarily would be governed by state law. Furthermore, the
suggestion of "proportionate distribution" hardly authorizes the creation of a hierarchy
that puts claims for compensatory damages ahead of claims for punitive damages.
116 11 U.S.C. § 726(4) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) provides that payment of punitive dam-
ages is subordinated to payment of other classes of claims in Chapter 7 liquidation pro-
ceedings; see also In re Keene Corp., 162 B.R. 935, 948 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994) (discussing
possible grounds for subordinating punitive damages claims); 4 HERBERT B. NEWBERG &
ALBA CoNTE, NEWBERG ON CLAss ACIONS, § 20.22 (3d ed. 1992).
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to conduct trials over whether a statutory scheme should be ignored
because a more efficient mechanism can be fashioned by judges."117
Moreover, the Bankruptcy Act affords some protections for the claim-
ants affected by the cram-down, protections that may not be repli-
cated in a judge-fashioned alternative confected under Rule 23. At
both a substantive and procedural level, then, the contrast between
the Bankruptcy Act and the class action authorization provided by
Rule 23(b) (1) (B) suggests the impropriety of aggressive use of the
class action rule.
Erie has not become irrelevant, and neither Rule 23 nor a residue
of "equitable jurisdiction" authorizes wholesale tort reform in class ac-
tions. But that need not entirely spell the doom of mass tort class
actions. As Professor Hazard observed over twenty years ago, there is
an unavoidable synergy between substance and procedure, and "[t]he
necessary technique is one of circumspect consideration of the appro-
priate role of the judicial institution in shaping the substantive conse-
quences of procedures such as those established by Rule 23."118
Courts handling mass tort class actions do more than aspire to tort
reform of the type described above. They also attempt to deal cre-
atively with problems of cost and delay, which are suitably character-
ized as "procedural" concerns. Moreover, even conceding the
applicability of state substantive law, one must also take care to note
whose substantive interests are protected by it. For example, when
asbestos plaintiffs consented to an abbreviated class action procedure
in Judge Parker's court in Texas, defendants asked the Fifth Circuit to
disallow the approach on the ground that it contravened state law. In
rejecting defendants' arguments, the appellate court was able to note
that "it seems that the defendants enjoy all of the advantages, and the
plaintiffs incur the disadvantages, of the class action-with one excep-
tion: the cases are to be brought to trial."19 When he was overturned
for further innovations in a later asbestos class action, 20 Judge Parker
could have argued that the objecting defendants suffered no aggre-
gate harm since they would not incur any greater net liability, and that
the plaintiffs' assent to the plan should suffice.
Even though federal judges may not arrogate unto themselves the
power to achieve mass tort reform nor use Rule 23 to cram defend-
ants' version down plaintiffs' throats, Rule 23 may provide the glue
that allows the parties to arrange tort reform by consent. But mean-
ingful consent is essential to this undertaking. For the defendants in
117 In reJoint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 14 F.3d 726, 733 (2d Cir. 1993).
118 Geoffrey B. Hazard, The Effect of the Class Action Device Upon the Substantive Law, 58
F.R.D. 307, 307 (1973).
119 Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 473 (5th Gir. 1986).
120 See supra text accompanying note 85.
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recent cases, consent is obvious. For the plaintiffs, however, consent
depends upon a program of notice that genuinely gives members of
the class meaningful notice and a choice, a topic addressed below. 121
If notice is provided, the court should ordinarily enforce the agree-
ment to submit to a separate compensation regime. 122 Rule 23 there-
fore can facilitate tort reform in certain instances. But it is not
enough that the court desires to impose it. The parties must consent
to tort reform.
B. The Future Claims Problem
Central to the defendants'-and the courts'-desire to achieve
litigation cloture in mass tort litigation is the inclusion of future
claims. Indeed, the Georgine settlement in Philadelphia and the
Fibreboard settlement in Texas are confined to claims of those who
have not yet sued. 123 For these purposes, one might view "future"
claims as including three distinct categories: (i) claimants who have
suffered injury but not yet filed suit, (ii) claimants who have been ex-
posed but have not yet suffered or manifested injury, and (iii) claim-
ants who have not yet been exposed. Claimants in the third category
are an insignificant factor in the recent settlements because the prod-
ucts in question are no longer in general use. Nevertheless, for many
class members covered by the recent settlements the existence or ex-
tent of a substantial claim is impossible to gauge at present. Perhaps,
as a consequence, the court may not affect their rights under the aegis
of Rule 23.
At its most basic, this seems a sort of Article IIIjurisdictional argu-
ment. In order for a court to have jurisdiction there must first be a
case or controversy, and that may not occur until the claimant can
determine that he or she has a claim. In the class action situation, the
challenge is not to the ability of the court to adjudicate the claims of
the individuals who have filed the class action, whether or not they
have manifested injury. It would seem a given that they have standing
to sue since they have already been exposed, 124 and presumably a
claim for relief sufficient to endow a federal court with jurisdiction to
determine its validity.' 25 Rather, the challenge in the class action situ-
121 See infra part II.C.
122 Cf. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment claim subject to arbitration pursuant to employment contract); Shear-
son/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (securities fraud claim
similarly subject to arbitration).
123 See supra text accompanying notes 54-55, 69.
124 See., e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 72-78
(1978) (finding standing satisfied in suit regarding risks of future operation of nuclear
power plant that had not been completed).
125 Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946) (suit that fails to state claim for relief neverthe-
less suffices to endow court with jurisdiction unless "wholly insubstantial and frivolous").
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ation is whether others who have not invoked the court's jurisdiction
can nevertheless be bound by the exercise of it.126
Assuming there is a possible defense of prematurity, the issue is
whether a settlement in the face of that uncertainty should be bind-
ing. For individuals who filed suit, an individual settlement that pre-
cludes later suit for after-arising manifestations should ordinarily be
effective to bar the later claim. Indeed, that is part of the problem for
pleural thickening claimants, and it might make the recent settle-
ments more attractive for them.127 As a matter of jurisdiction, it
seems that the same should hold true for unnamed members of the
class, even though they were unaware of their claims at the time of the
settlement.
To deny the court the power to affect future claims would run
counter to the handling of other class action issues and would
threaten to disrupt an important segment of class action litigation.
When injunctive or similar relief is the object of the suit, it has been
common to include the claims of those who cannot presently be iden-
tified in the class. In some instances, this includes claimants who
could not identify themselves as members of the class.
The Supreme Court has addressed the mootness limitation on
federal judicial power in such cases. In a certified class action that
challenged the adequacy of procedures afforded pretrial detainees,128
the Court was confronted with the fact that the named plaintiffs had
been convicted by the time the case reached appeal, so their pretrial
126 Cf. In reAgent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 996 F.2d 1425, 1434 (2d Cir. 1993), cert.
denied 114 S. Ct. 1125 and 114 S. Ct. 1126 (1994) (upholding jurisdiction over claims of
class members who had not manifested injury).
Compare Schweitzer v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 758 F.2d 936 (3d Cir. 1985), in which
the court held that a bankruptcy discharge of a railroad did not affect workers' claims for
asbestos exposure against the railroad under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. The
court reasoned that the workers should not be viewed as having had "claims" within the
meaning of the Bankruptcy Act that were subject to discharge at the time of the bank-
ruptcy proceeding. In large measure, this ruling was based on a substantive judgment
concerning the FELA that resembles the criticism directed toward allowing current suit for
pleural claims:
If mere exposure to asbestos were sufficient to give rise to a F.E.L.A. cause
of action, countless seemingly healthy railroad workers, workers who might
never manifest injury, would have tort claims cognizable in federal court. It
is obvious that proof of damages in such cases would be highly speculative,
likely resulting in windfalls for those who never take ill and insufficient
compensation for those who do. Requiring manifest injury as a necessary
element of an asbestos-related tort action avoids these problems and best
serves the underlying purpose of tort law: the compensation of victims who
have suffered.
Id. at 942. Schweitzer is discussed further infra in note 169 and accompanying text.
127 For discussion of the predicament of those who sue when their only symptom is
thickening of the pleura of the lungs and are later foreclosed when more serious problems
arise, see supra note 27.
128 Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
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detention had ended. The Court nevertheless concluded that the
class action was not moot because the claims were "by nature tempo-
rary" and impossible to resolve with full appeal before conviction or
release.129 Even though there was "no indication that the particular
named plaintiffs might again be subject to pretrial detention," 30 the
Court held that the case was not moot because "the constant existence
of a class of persons suffering the deprivation is certain."13 But the
identity of these people could not be ascertained. Just as there was no
way to know if the named plaintiffs would again be subject to pretrial
detention, so was it impossible to deternine whether anyone else in
particular would be so detained. Yet all these people could presuma-
bly be properly included in the class action.
A similar indifference to the identity of class members is evident
in cases concerning the definition of the class, which frequently in-
cludes future members.'3 2 Employment discrimination suits are regu-
larly brought under Rule 23(b) (2) on behalf of classes of present and
futurejob holders or applicants.'33 The resulting decrees, possibly in-
volving affirmative action provisions, are binding on individuals who
later become members of the class but could not have known that
they were included when the decree was entered. Even more dramati-
cally, in school desegregation class actions the resulting decree may be
binding on people who were not even born at the time it was en-
tered.'3 4 The decree may be challenged by those who were not mem-
bers of the class,' 35 but for those who are members, the decree is
ordinarily binding. 3 6 In prison conditions litigation, the handling of
individual claims of class members for after-occurring events has
presented substantial difficulties, 13 7 but it has not been suggested that
129 Id. at 110 n.11.
130 This characterization of Gerstein comes from United States Parole Comm'n v. Ger-
aghty, 445 U.S. 388, 399 (1980).
131 Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 110-11 n.11.
132 E.g., Yaffe v. Powers, 454 F.2d 1362, 1364 (1st Cir. 1972) (class of persons who "wish
to... engage, in the City of Fall River, in peaceful political discussion... without surveil-
lance"); Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (class of
all present and future players in the NBA).
133 E.g., General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982).
134 For example, in San Francisco, Chinese students must achieve significantly higher
scores than applicants from other ethnic groups to obtain admission to the city's academic
high school, Lowell, due to a 1983 desegregation decree. They have recently sought to
change the terms of the decree, which was entered shortly after the most recent applicants
were born. SeeJames Finefrock, Beyond School Quotas, S.F. EXAMINER, July 13, 1994, at A16.
135 See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989).
136 Cf Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank, 467 U.S. 867, 872 (1984) (denial of interven-
tion to class member in employment discrimination action because "she was a member of
the class for which relief had been ordered and therefore her rights would be protected in
the Stage II proceedings to be held on the question of relief").
137 For example, in Bogard v. Cook, 586 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1978), there was an opt-out
class action for injunctive and declaratory relief against various features of the prison, in-
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the class action court was without authority to resolve, or at least to
limit, focus, and confine, these claims. In sum, it has long been ac-
cepted that in appropriate circumstances the court may alter or fore-
close the claims of class members that have not matured at the time
the class action judgment is entered.
These cases are admittedly different from the mass tort class ac-
tions, which revolve entirely around claims for money damages rather
than injunctive relief. Arguably, class actions for injunctive relief are
not necessary, and classwide relief could sometimes be granted in an
individual action without preclusive effect.138 But there is authority
for the proposition that a class suit is necessary for classwide injunctive
relief, 3 9 and it is beyond question that Rule 23(b) (2) authorizes such
class actions. 140 Arguably, too, the Supreme Court's treatment of
these class actions leans toward the "representation" rather than the
"joinder" mode of analysis. 14 1 But the occasional assertion that there
is greater "cohesiveness" in injunctive class actions than in damages
cluding the practice of arming guards as "trusty shooters" to patrol and discipline the in-
mate population. One of the prisoners who did not opt out sued for injuries resulting
from being shot by a trusty shooter that occurred after the record was closed in the class
action, and the state urged that the class action judgment foreclosed his claim. The appel-
late court rejected this argument on the ground that the class action "was never framed or
presented as a suit for monetary relief and nothing in the notice sent to the inmates gave
any indication that such relief was possible." Id. at 408. Because "[pirinciples of resjudi-
cata are not ironclad," id., the court declined to foreclose the damages claim; ef.Johnson v.
McCaskle, 770 F.2d 445 (5th Cir. 1985) (dealing with requirement that claims of individual
prisoners are handled in conjunction with class action or under auspices of class action
court).
138 See Bresgal v. Brock, 843 F.2d 1163, 1169 (9th Cir. 1987) ("There is no general
requirement that an injunction affect only the parties in the suit.").
139 In Everhart v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 1532 (10th Cir. 1988), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
Sullivan v. Everhart, 494 U.S. 83 (1990), the court of appeais held that the district court
had erred in entering a statewide injunction against certain welfare administrative prac-
tices even though it found that the practices were illegal:
The statewide injunction entered by the district court was tantamount to a
grant of classwide relief.... At thisjuncture, there has been no determina-
tion on the issue of class certification; indeed, the district court expressly
declined to do so. Absent a class certification, the district court should not
have treated the suit as a class action by granting statewide injunctive relief,
and accordingly should have tailored its injunction "to affect only those
persons over [whom] it has power."
Id. at 1538-39 (alteration in original citation omitted); see also Zepeda v. United States Im-
migration Naturalization Serv., 753 F.2d 719, 727-28 (9th Cir. 1983) ("[T]he injunction
must be limited to apply only to the individual plaintiffs unless the district judge certifies a
class of plaintiffs.").
140 Whether that authorization benefits plaintiffs or defendants is debatable. See
Timothy Wilton, The Class Action in Social Reform Litigation: In Whose Interest?, 63 B.U. L.
REv. 597 (1983) (arguing that certification of a (b) (2) class action benefits defendants, not
plaintiffs, by assuring them that a victory will foreclose later relitigation).
141 See Diane Wood Hutchinson, Class Actions: joinder or Representation Device?, 1983
Sup. CT. REv. 459.
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class actions is unpersuasive, 42 and it is hardly clear why, at the raw
level of judicial power, this distinction should operate to preclude
foreclosing later suits in class actions for damages but not in class ac-
tions for injunctive relief. Finally, it is true that the court's power to
modify an injunction later may make the binding effect on future
members less onerous, but it is often hard to justify such a modifica-
tion, and this prospect does not rise to the level of power.
Those who oppose the inclusion of future claims in mass tort
class actions nevertheless portray the cases in a lurid light. The peti-
tion for certiorari filed by the Agent Orange claimants, for example,
said that the consequence of including their claims was "brutalizing
142 On this question, the points made by Professor Yeazell concerning Rule 23's re-
quirement of a right to opt out in damages but not injunctive class actions seem trenchant:
[T]he rule requires notice just when discrepancy of interest among the
class's members is least likely. Most 23(b) (3) actions will involve an active
plaintiff, frequently bolstered by a lawyer, seeking monetary recovery on
behalf of some group that the defendant has allegedly damaged. Under
such circumstances the absentees might be quite concerned that the active
litigant and the lawyer have at least as great a financial stake in the suit as
they, that the active litigant will press the suit vigorously, and that the coun-
sel representing them is competent. But the threshold inquiries of 23(a)
focus on such questions. What is not likely is that, if such conditions are
fulfilled, the absentees would prefer not to sue at all. It is an axiom of
modem social and economic life that we all wish to command more of the
world's wealth; there is not much sense in asking someone whether one
dollar or two would be preferable.
If the treatment of (b) (3) actions seems to overprotect individual au-
tonomy, the treatment of (b) (2) actions seems equally puzzling for the op-
posite reason. For suits falling into that category the rule requires no
notice, relying entirely on the threshold findings of common interest, typi-
cality, and adequate representation. Yet the rule does so in circumstances
where it is much more likely than in the (b) (3) cases that the interests of
the group's members will conflict and will be least amenable to abstract
assessment. An example will make the point. Like many American cities,
Boston in the 1970s found itself in the throes of a lawsuit over school inte-
gration. Managed by the NAACP, the plaintiffs' suit alleged numerous dis-
criminatory acts by the Boston School Committee and sought a widespread
integration decree that involved busing black children into the schools of
South Boston, where they encountered a hostile reception. Derrick Bell
has reported that many of Boston's black parents, on whose behalf the case
was brought, would have preferred a remedy that did not require their chil-
dren to attend school in a section of the city with poor schools and a tradi-
tion of violence. Indeed, some of them might have preferred entirely to
forgo the legal vindication of their rights if such was the only foreseeable
remedy. Under such circumstances, Bell argued, some more searching as-
sessment of interest than the one called for by Rule 23(b) (2) is necessary.
STEPHEN YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLAss ACrION 252-54
(1987) (citations omitted).
In school desegregation cases like the example cited by Yeazell, it may be that courts
have indulged a substantive preference of their own for integration. The basic point to be
made, however, is that assuming greater cohesiveness in injunctive than in damages class
actions is dubious.
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individual rights."143 One might well question the adequacy of the
settlement in that case, as it was predicated on a very low prospect of
success and therefore offered the defendants a very deep discount.'4
As noted below,145 the settlement review process is very important to
protect the interests of absent class members. But that process pro-
vides some assurance that class members with future (and present)
claims are treated fairly. Despite the risk of mistaken forecasts as to
the number of claims to be made,146 at least on the surface the recent
settlements provide substantial compensation for claimants through a
simplified claims process. Whether this option is genuinely attractive
to individual class members may be uncertain, but this uncertainty
does not make the settlements a "sham," as some have charged.'4 7
Moreover, unlike future class members in injunctive class actions,
these class members should be able to determine whether they are
included in the class definition even if they then have a tough time
deciding whether the deal is a good one. There is nothing intrinsic in
a settlement of future claims for damages that makes them any more a
sham than a settlement in the class action format of future claims for
injunctive relief.
In sum, an absolute bar on including in a class action exposed
persons who have not manifested serious medical consequences of
their exposure would not only prevent these cases from achieving
their objective but would also run counter to the handling of other
types of class actions. 4
143 Petition for certiorari at 58, Hartman v. Diamond Shamrock Chems., 114 S. Ct.
1126 (1994) (No. 93-1035).
144 See PETER SCHUcK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRLAL (1986).
145 See infra text accompanying notes 198-208.
146 The problem would be significantly more acute if asbestos or silicone gel implants
were still in general use, for then there would seem no reliable way to determine how many
more claims might be made.
147 SeeMike McGee, Implant Offer Splits Plaintiffs Bar, S.F. RECORDER, Sept. 10, 1993, at 1
(quoting plaintiff's attorney in silicone gel litigation as saying. "It's a sham, deceptive to
the women who have been severely injured, because it leads them to believe they will get
more money than they will."). In the same vein, a doctor called by the objectors to the
Philadelphia asbestos class action settlement said that it was "a lousy, reprehensible, and
diabolically cunningly designed document to take the rights and privileges away from the
asbestos-exposed workers of America." Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246,
271 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
148 Questions have also been raised about whether the amount-in-controversy require-
ment for federal jurisdiction has been satisfied in these cases, but these questions do not
seem to raise serious obstacles. There are, of course, reasons to question the wisdom of
Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973), which mandates that each class
member satisfy the requirement. Application of Zahn demands a curious inquiry. Usually
the court is to ask whether a claim that on its face exceeds the jurisdictional minimum is
made in good faith. Saint Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288-89
(1938). That does not work very well as to claims that have not really been made, like
those of the absent class members, since it is difficult to assess the good faith of somebody
who has not made a claim. Probably the best approach is to ask whether a claim in excess
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C. Notice and Opt Out
If the analysis above is correct,149 the limited fund concept
should rarely, if ever, be available in mass tort litigation. Even if it can
be sustained in some instances, there is no denying that the claims
asserted are for compensatory damages, and there is arguably a consti-
tutional right to opt out.' 50 Rule 23(c) (2) surely requires it for most
actions for money damages. Even if that requirement somehow would
not apply as a matter of due process or Rule 23, the solution to the
Erie problem discussed above' 5' -depends on some level of consent
that is fortified by a right to opt out. Even if no such right existed,
Rule 23(e) clearly would require notice to the class of any settlement.
Notice is thus essential to making mass tort class actions work. With-
out adequate notice, there cannot be class actions like the ones re-
cently settled.
Notice presents severe challenges in mass tort cases, but perhaps
not more so than in some other class actions. We have seen classes of
thousands, or even millions, in securities fraud or antitrust cases. 52
The uncertainty about who is included in the class in some mass tort
cases also exists in other cases, particularly consumer class actions.
Just as possible class members may not know whether they were ex-
posed to the asbestos products of certain manufacturers, they may be
unsure whether they flew on certain airlines, 153 or used a certain cab
company's cabs.'5 Indeed, the press attention accorded to recent
of the jurisdictional minimum could be made in good faith by this person. That determi-
nation should be satisfied on the basis of the analysis above, see supra text accompanying
notes 123-24, since a colorable claim for increased risk of serious injury, coupled with a
punitive damages claim, could for purposes of the jurisdictional minimum be made in
good faith. Moreover, it has been held that Zahn did not survive the enactment of 28
U.S.C. § 1867. See In reAbbott Lab., 51 F.3d 524 (5th Cir. 1995).
149 See supra text accompanying notes 102-17.
150 See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985) (holding that if the
claim involves money damages, due process requires that plaintiff receive notice plus "an
opportunity to remove [itself] from the class by executing and returning an 'opt out' or
,request for exclusion' form to the court"); Brown v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 982 F.2d 386 (9th
Cir. 1992) (minimum due process requires that plaintiff receive an opportunity to opt out
if monetary claims are involved), cert. dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 1359 (1994). For a general dis-
cussion, see Arthur R. Miller & David Crump, Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in Multistate
Class Actions After Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 96 YALE LJ. 1, 38-57 (1986). For a
narrower reading of Shutts, see Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Jurisdiction and Transfer Proposals for
Complex Litigation, 10 Rxv. LrrIG. 325, 360 n.141 (1991) (arguing that Shutts is a mandate
for a right to opt out only for class members who lack minimum contacts with the forum,
and only as to "known plaintiffs").
151 See supra part II .
152 E.g., Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974) (class estimated to include
six million traders of securities).
153 See In re Domestic Air Transp. Antitrust Litig., 141 F.RD. 534 (N.D. Ga. 1992) (no-
tice to persons who had flown on domestic airlines during class period).
154 See Darr v. Yellow Cab. Co., 433 P.2d 732 (Cal. 1964).
[Vol. 80:858
TORT REFORM VIA RULE 23
mass tort settlements could ensure a greater dissemination of informa-
tion about those cases than many others.
At the same time, it is hard to ignore the reality that meaningful
notice to an entire class is extremely hard to accomplish. For many
citizens, even a straightforward notice about a class action mailed to
their homes may be incomprehensible.1 55 There is no question that
appreciating the impact of the current mass tort settlements, much
less evaluating them, is a formidable task. Even to arrive at the point
of objecting that "They can't do that, can they?" requires some appre-
ciation not only of how the settlements implement a new compensa-
tion scheme, but also of the attributes of the litigation alternative that
these settlements seek to displace. Having passed this point, the class
member must attempt to compare the likely value to him or her of the
two options available. Because there are many imponderables, such as
the number and severity of claims that will be made against the settle-
ment fund, that comparison of options is likely to challenge the ex-
perts. In the Fibreboard litigation, the vagueness of the criteria for
paying claims, and the absence of any dollar amounts, made the task
particularly difficult.
Coupled with the complexity of this analytical task is a nagging
sense that the uniquely personal nature of the claims compromised
here should matter, as Professor Trangsrud has argued in another
context.156 Whether or not class members can make an accurate as-
sessment of the coupons offered in settlement of price-fixing claims
against airlines is less important than whether people who may be re-
linquishing the right to go to court to recover damages for life-threat-
ening personal injuries understand what they are doing. Indeed, one
of the justifications of the consumer class action-that it is more im-
portant to deprive the defendant of ill-gotten gains than to deliver
compensation to victims15 7-may underlie the indifference the courts
have exhibited toward providing notice and the right to opt out in
such cases. 158 Rule 23(b) (3) invites consideration of the interest of
155 See Arthur R. Miller, Problems of Giving Notice in Class Actions, 58 F.R.D. 313, 321-22
(1973) (quoting responses of class members who clearly were bewildered by the notices
they received).
156 Roger Trangsrud, Mass Trials in Mass Tort Cases: A Dissen 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 69,
74-76 (exploring "natural law notion" of "individual claim autonomy in substantial tort
cases").
157 Cf. Kenneth Dam, Class Actions: Efficiency, Compensation, Deterrence, and Conflict of
Interest, 4J. LEGAL STUD. 47 (1975).
158 SeeJonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attornes Role in Class
Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. Cm.
L. Rxv. 1, 27-28 (1991):
The pecuniary costs of notice in large class actions can run well over half a
million dollars .... These costs would be justifiable if they were out-
weighed by compensating benefits that might exist in a case with substantial
individual claims. In the large-scale, small-claim class action, however, the
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claimants in controlling their own cases at the certification stage; in
personal injury class actions that means ensuring that they understand
what they are giving up in settlements like the ones recently approved.
In sum, courts should be singularly sensitive to the adequacy of notice
in mass tort class actions, although that sensitivity need not rise to the
level of a categorical preclusion of the objectives sought by the recent
mass tort class action settlements.
At the heart of the notice problem lie the dual purposes of notice
to the class, purposes which may themselves be at odds with one an-
other. One purpose is to allow class members to monitor the per-
formance of the class representatives and class counsel. This purpose
is embodied in the right under Rule 23(e) to object to a proposed
settlement and the right under Rule 23(c) (2) (C) to enter an appear-
ance through counsel. This notice purpose does not erect a substan-
tial obstacle to mass tort class actions, for adequate notice can be
accomplished even if some class members cannot be identified. 159
When there is a right to opt out, however, this partial notice may not
suffice to protect those who are not notified since those who opt out
are not likely to pursue monitoring that would protect those who do
not.
On balance, the monitoring function does not seem to have been
undermined in the recent mass tort class actions. Beyond question
there have been vigorous and multiple objections in Georgine, the Phil-
adelphia settlement. Nevertheless, the class definition in that case-
limiting the class to those who have not yet sued-significantly erodes
the monitoring function and seems a tactic to be avoided. But even
after Georgine was commenced, new suits were being filed at the rate of
about 1,500 per month,160 and all of these claimants were individually
notified. Unless all or most of these opted out in a timely fashion,
benefits of notice appear minimal at best. It is doubtful whether notice has
any social utility other than that of informing the class members of the
claim. Most plaintiffs are unlikely to place any significant value on such
information.
159 In its cornerstone ruling on due process rights to notice, the Supreme Court ex-
plicitly recognized this fact
The individual interest does not stand alone but is identical with that of a
class. The rights of each in the integrity of the fund and the fidelity of the
trustee are shared by many other beneficiaries. Therefore notice reason-
ably certain to reach most of those interested in objecting is likely to safe-
guard the interests of all, since any objection sustained would inure to the
benefit of all.
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 319 (1950).
160 See Declaration of Katherine Kinsella at 10, Carlough v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 158
F.R.D. 314 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (No. CIV. A. 93-0215) ("CCR counsel gave me a list of over
9,000 plaintffs... whose suits for asbestos-related personal injuries against one or more
CCR defendants were filed and reported to the CCR from January 15, 1993 through July
15, 1993."). Katherine Kinsella is Senior Vice President of The Kamber Group, the enter-
prise hired by the proponents of the class action to conduct the class notice campaign.
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their individual notification provided a source of substantial monitor-
ing. In the silicone gel class action, there was no effort to exclude
current plaintiffs from the class definition, so this problem did not
exist.161 In Fibreboard, Judge Parker appointed a guardian ad litem to
scrutinize the fairness of the settlement terms from the perspective of
the claimants. 162
A greater obstacle is presented by the other objective of notice-
enabling the class members to decide whether to opt out. In this con-
nection, class members who receive notice obviously do not protect
the interests of those who do not. If those who receive notice all opt
out, that may incline the court to reject the settlement, thereby achiev-
ing the same result for those who do not receive notice, but this result
is not required. 163 When a significant proportion of those notified do
not opt out, the significance of the decision by others to do so is more
difficult to fathom. Given the individual interests involved in personal
injury claims, the decision by one claimant to opt out does not seem
to bear on the decisions of others whether to exclude themselves.
There is arguably no substitute for actual notice to each class member
to protect the right to opt out. Of course, if the court can deny the
right to opt out altogether, as Judge Parker has tried to do, this con-
cern is mooted.
As a starting point, it is settled that in some circumstances parties
may be bound even though they do not receive notice. Where a bank-
ruptcy discharge is involved, 64 or the state's interest in closing trusts
applies, 165 inability to notify all claimants does not deprive these
claimants of due process. But when such interests are not present,166
161 The true motivating force behind the objections is from lawyers, not claimants.
Were there no source of lawyers with an interest in opposing or challenging such a settle-
ment, the monitoring purpose might well be compromised.
162 The guardian ad litem is Professor Eric Green of Boston University Law School.
Professor Green submitted a 92 page report to the court concluding that the settlement
agreement was fair, reasonable and adequate. See Report of Guardian ad Litem Eric D.
Green, Feb. 9, 1995 at 91, Ahearn v. Fibreboard Corp., 1994 WL 480588 (E.D. Tex. 1995)
(No. 6:93CV526).
163 For discussion of the role of class opposition in the settlement approval process, see
infra text accompanying note 205.
164 In reJohns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. 618, 626 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding that in
bankruptcy proceedings, notice by publication is constitutionally adequate "to those bene-
ficiaries whose interests are either conjectural or future"), affid in part, rev'd in par 78 B.R.
407 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); and aff'd sub nom. Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d 636 (2d Cir.
1988); Vancouver Women's Health Collective Soc'y v. A.H. Robins Co., 820 F.2d 1359 (4th
Cir. 1987) (approving publication as a procedure by which A.H. Robins would give world-
wide notice of its bankruptcy proceedings).
165 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank, 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950) (referring to "the inter-
est of each state in providing a means to close trusts that exist by the grace of its laws").
166 Cf. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 384-35 (1976) (assessing due process rights
with a view to three factors, including government's interest in function involved and bur-
dens of more extensive procedures).
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there could be an absolute rule requiring actual notice. It should be
clear, however, that there is no such requirement under current law.
In Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin, for example, the Supreme Court ap-
peared perfectly comfortable with the possibility that more than half
of the class members would not receive individual notice; the only
debate was over whether mailing notice to the approximately thirty-
five percent of class members who could be identified was required by
Rule 23.167 Thus, there appears to be no absolute bar to preclusion of
claims by those who do not receive notice; a right to opt out does not
necessarily carry with it an absolute right to personal notice.
But one might urge such a bar with regard to future claims. At its
most forceful, this argument would forbid preclusion even as to class
members who received mailed notice. The adequacy of notice could
turn on whether a person who does not currently know whether or to
what extent he or she will develop certain illnesses or injuries may
constitutionally be required to decide whether to have those claims
presented in the regular court system or through the alternative
scheme created by the tort reform effected by these cases. In the
Agent Orange litigation, the Second Circuit found that preclusion ap-
plied to claimants with after-arising claims even though they did not
receive notice, emphasizing the adequacy of representation these
claimants received from others.168 But the Third Circuit, interpreting
the Bankruptcy Act and the Federal Torts Claims Act, suggested possi-
ble constitutional obstacles to barring unmanifested claims of railroad
workers for exposure to asbestos pursuant to a bankruptcy reorganiza-
tion.169 Arguably no notice would suffice until the claim manifested
itself.
167 Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 166 (1974) (class estimated to contain
over six million members, of whom approximately 2.25 million could be identified).
168 In reAgent Orange Prods. Liab. Litig., 996 F.2d 1425 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114
S. Ct. 1125 and 114 S. Ct. 1126 (1994). The court stated:
In the instant case, society's interest in the efficient and fair resolution
of large-scale litigation outweighs the gains from individual notice and opt-
out rights, whose benefits here are conjectural at best. As appellants cor-
rectIy note, providing individual notice and opt-out rights to persons who
are unaware of an injury would probably do little good. Their rights are
better served, we think, by requiring that "fair and just recovery procedures
be [ ] made available to these claimants," and by ensuring that they receive
vigorous and faithful vicarious representation.
Id. at 1435 (quoting 1 HERBERT NEWBERG & ALAa CONTE, NEWBERO ON CLASS ACIONS,
§ 1.26 at 1-56 (3d ed. 1992)).
169 Schweitzer v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 758 F.2d 936 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
864 (1985). The court held that, under the Bankruptcy Act, these workers did not have
'claims" they had to assert by the bar date of the bankruptcy proceeding. It found in its
interpretation of the Bankruptcy Act a way to avoid constitutional shoals:
[I]f contingent claims were held to include possible future tort claims, then
every hypothetical chain of future events leading to liability, regardless of
how likely or unlikely, might be the basis for a contingent claim. The
holder of any such "claim" whose whereabouts were known would then
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Of course, as with the Agent Orange cases, the acid test for the
recent settlements will not be presented until there is a suit by a class
member who did not opt out and who claims a due process right to
sue because he or she was unaware of injury at the time of the settle-
ment. 70 The prospects for such a challenge are not great if the actual
notice efforts are found to be sufficient. Consider, for instance, the
situation of a potential claimant who has developed pleural thicken-
ing. For such a person, the decision whether to opt out and retain the
right to sue may be nearly as difficult as for a person who has not yet
manifested any condition. Unless due process requires a new chance
to opt out with each deterioration of a claimant's condition, the pleu-
ral thickening claimant should be unable to avoid binding effect. Ac-
cordingly, the difficulty of the decision is hard to accept as a
categorical due process limitation on requiring the claimant to choose
now. As the Supreme Court is fond of reminding us, due process is a
flexible concept.' 7 ' The protective provisions of the class action de-
vice itself-court appointment of counsel to represent the interests of
absent class members, notice to the class, and substantive review of
any settlement by the court-guard the interests of the future claim-
ant and bear on whether notice should also be absolutely required.
When the procedural protections are coupled with the provision in
the recent settlements ofan alternative compensation scheme and the
fact that the specifics on this scheme were included in the notice
materials, a categorical due process prohibition on precluding later
suits by those who do not opt out seems unnecessary. Indeed, other
bankruptcy cases suggest that this Third Circuit decision need not
lead to such a rule.172
seem to be a "known creditor." Thus, in our case, every employee who had
worked near asbestos and whose address was known would be a known
creditor, yet none received personal notice in the prior reorganization pro-
ceedings. We believe that our interpretation, which avoids such thorny
constitutional issues, is the proper view of Congressional intent.
Id. at 944.
170 There has already been a variant of this situation in the Philadelphia litigation
because two claimants sought permission to opt out after the deadline for doing so on the
ground that the disease only manifested itself at that time. Citing the provision in the
settlement agreement that allowed defendants to withdraw if they concluded that too many
had opted out, the court refused leave on the ground that if belated opting out were
allowed "the entire Gergine settlement likely would disintegrate." Georgine v. Amchem
Corp., No. Civ. A. 93-0215, 1994 WL 637404, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 10, 1994).
171 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) (referring to "truism" that due
process is not a technical conception with fixed content unrelated to context, and that it
calls for such procedural protections as situation demands).
172 The Third Circuit itself has even held that antitrust claims that have accrued are
barred by a bankruptcy reorganization, even in the face of allegations that they were con-
cealed in a situation where the result was an absolute bar on all relief. In re Penn Central
Transp. Co., 771 F.2d 762 (3d Cir. 1985).
Other courts have questioned the Third Circuit's interpretation of the Bankruptcy Act
in treating the claims of those with after-arising asbestos injuries as not being "claims" for
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Assuming that there is no absolute bar to the foreclosure of fu-
ture claims on grounds of notice, there is still a very serious notice
problem. On their face, the recent class actions make a substantial
effort to notify class members of their rights. For those who have not
manifested any substantial injury, however, there must be a more seri-
ous effort than for those who have.' 73 Claims that class members can-
not be located through reasonable efforts should be scrutinized with
care. Because exposure effectively amounts to inclusion, lists of em-
ployees of companies that used asbestos products, and lists of mem-
bers of pertinent unions, should be highly useful. 74 Similarly, the
notice materials should be as understandable as possible. In the sili-
cone gel litigation, for example, the court tried to foster comprehen-
sion by directing that the class notice would supersede the actual
settlement agreement unless otherwise noted. 75 More generally,
there should be a significant thrust toward making clear the implica-
tions of foregoing traditional tort litigation.
Unless claimants with unmanifested claims are absolutely pro-
tected against having to decide now whether to exclude themselves
purposes of that Act. See In reJohns-Manville Corp., 57 B.R. 680, 686-88 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1986); cf Grady v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 839 F.2d 198, 203 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 487
U.S. 1260 (1988). Another has explained the Third Circuit's decision as reflecting the
peculiar equities of a situation in which no provision at all had been made for the future
claimants. See In re Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R., 974 F.2d 775, 782 (7th Cir.
1992).
Consider also Judge Posner's speculations about the proper interpretation of the
bankruptcy court's power as to entirely unmatured claims, arguendo treating an interpre-
tation like the Third Circuit's as correct:
Even in states where exposed workers are not injured in a tort sense till
the disease manifests itself, and therefore do not have an accrued tort claim
in any sense, and even assuming that an unaccrued tort claim cannot be a
"claim" within the meaning of [the Bankruptcy Act], . . . a bankruptcy
court's equitable powers ... just might be broad enough to enable the
court to make provision for future asbestosis claims against the bankrupt
when it approved the final plan of reorganization .... If future claims
cannot be discharged before they ripen, UNR may not be able to emerge
from bankruptcy with reasonable prospects for continued existence as a
going concern. In that event, and assuming that UNR's going-concern
value would exceed its liquidation value, both UNR... and future plaintiffs
would be made worse off, and UNR's current creditors would not necessar-
ily be made better off, by the court's failure to act along the lines proposed
by UNR.
In re UNR Indus., 725 F.2d 1111, 1119-20 (7th Cir. 1984).
173 Cf Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949) (refusing to interpret statute of limita-
tions to bar claims for disease that manifested itself long after initial exposure).
174 Cf In reAgent Orange Prods. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 169 (2d Cir. 1987), cert.
denied; 484 U.S. 1004 (1988) (stating that "there was no easily accessible list of veterans").
175 "[I]n the event of any direct conflict, the terms of this Notice take precedence over
the terms of the Settlement Agreement unless language in the Notice indicates that it is
intended as only a general description or is subject to details contained in the Settlement
Agreement." Breast Implant Litigation Settlement Notice 1 9, In re Silicone Gel Breast
Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., 1994 WL 578353 (N.D. Ala. 1994) (No. CV-92-P-10000-S).
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from a class action, the ultimate question for mass tort class actions is
whether they can adequately identify and inform absent class mem-
bers of their rights. Given the underlying Erie issues and the nature of
these claims, intense scrutiny of both the efforts and their results is
warranted. Given the immense amounts at stake in the current settle-
ments, even the multi-million dollar efforts mounted by their propo-
nents may not suffice. Moreover, where there are requirements (such
as those in Silicone Gel) that claimants take affirmative action by regis-
tering to protect their rights, the attention to notice should be even
more exacting. There are certainly indications that even the million-
dollar notice efforts in the recent cases may be found inadequate.
IV
CONFINING THE EXERCISE OF RuLE 23 POWER TO ACHIEVE
TORT REFORM
If this Article correctly concludes that there is no categorical pro-
hibition on class action settlements like the recent efforts involving
asbestos and silicone gel implants, there still remain very difficult
questions about when and how the power to effect tort reform in this
fashion may be exercised. It is on these counts that the recent settle-
ments may be most vulnerable.
The starting point is that, as Newberg observes, "[a]part from
emotional aspects associated with severe personal injuries or death
arising from allegedly tortious conduct, none of the [commonly-of-
fered reasons for disfavoring certification in mass tort cases] is unique
to mass tort litigation."' 76 But the application of some commonly-en-
countered requirements for class actions such as common question
predominance, typicality, adequacy of representation, and notice to
the class present peculiarly vexing problems in the mass tort context.
For present purposes, it is important to keep in mind that the actual
features of the recent settlements are in no sense legally mandated or
invulnerable to attack for failure to satisfy these requirements.
A. Adequate Representation and the Conflict Problem
Permitting mass tort class actions does not necessarily endorse
the sort of "seamless web" classes seen in the recent settlements. To
the contrary, courts are directed to be sensitive to potential conflicts
among class members and should create subclasses when needed 'to
protect against unfairness. As Professor Laycock has pointed out so
effectively, a negotiation session that enables the negotiators to reach
agreement by compromising the interests of those not present is in-
herently flawed and raises due process questions about the rights of
176 3 NEvBERG & CoNTm, supra note 116, § 17.02 at 17-19.
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the unrepresented. 77 The same problem results when such conflicts
are not explored and provided for within the class. These conflict
concerns are particularly important in the settlement context. 78
Almost by definition, omnibus settlements in mass tort cases in-
volve subgroups with discrete interests that are, at least potentially, in
conflict with each other. If the settlement classifies claimants accord-
ing to disease category and provides different compensation for differ-
ent categories, it follows that those in each category require separate
representation. There may be no intrinsic "legal" prescription for the
relative shares of different groups, but allocation issues intrinsically
create at least potential conflicts.17 9 Beyond allocation, the definition
of the qualifying condition ordinarily would be particular to each
group because the sorts of medical showings needed for a claim based
on a given condition need to be tailored to that condition. Although
there may not necessarily be a conflict between the groups concern-
ing such qualifications, there is a theoretical possibility of trade-offs to
ease the path of one group of claimants in return for erecting barriers
to other kinds of claims.
The recent cases offer much room for concern regarding claim-
ants with different conditions, and regarding differences in otherwise
applicable state law. In asbestos cases, there is almost by definition a
difference in stakes between those who currently have manifested seri-
ous ailments and those who have not, possibly tempting the former to
sell out the latter. The latter group would include persons whose
states permit immediate substantial recoveries and others whose states
do not offer such liberal opportunities, suggesting a possible need to
subdivide this group according to applicable state law.180 Moreover,
relinquishing punitive damages claims altogether would similarly
seem to have uneven impact on claimants depending on the pertinent
punitive damages rules of their home jurisdictions. In the silicone gel
litigation, similar issues arise concerning the treatment of those with
conditions entitling them to sue for damages now and those who are
177 See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Due Process of Law in Trilateral Disputes, 78 IowA L. REv.
1011 (1993); Douglas Laycock, Consent Decrees Without Consent: The Rights of Nonconsenting
Third Parties, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL. F. 103.
178 "[A]dequacy of settlement terms cannot ordinarily redeem a settlement that was
bargained for by a party who was in a conflict position." In re Corrugated Container Anti-
trust Litig., 643 F.2d 195, 211 n.25 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 998 and 456 U.S.
1012 (1982).
179 Cf In re Chicken Antitrust Litig., 669 F.2d 228, 238-40 (5th Cir. 1982) (negotiation
and renegotiation of share of settlement provided to indirect purchasers in antitrust class
action after Supreme Court held that indirect purchasers have no claim for price-fixing
under federal antitrust law).
180 Arguably at some point one might be defining a subclass consisting of persons who
have no present right to sue under the law of their states, possibly raising severe "future
claims" problems. See supra part M.B.
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only eligible for such relief as medical monitoring. Furthermore, the
treatment of foreign plaintiffs in the silicone gel cases, who were al-
lowed only a tiny percentage of the compensation through the settle-
ment agreement, may provide a classic example of the sort of
disregard of those not present at the bargaining table that concerned
Professor Laycock. As to these claimants, however, there are forceful
competing considerations.' 8l
The courts' willingness to entrust a single negotiator or set of
negotiators with authority to accommodate these conflicting interests
in the recent settlements seems highly questionable. True, defining
the pertinent subclasses would sometimes present a serious challenge,
but there was apparently no effort to do so in these cases. True, pro-
viding separate representation for these differing interests might
make settlement more difficult to achieve. Yet in a real sense that is
the goal, for the settlement should not be achieved at the expense of
discemable subgroups who lack separate representation. Moreover, it
need not follow that those who have "more to lose," (i.e., claimants
from jurisdictions that more readily allow early claims for substantial
damages) would necessarily resist an overall package like the ones ac-
tually negotiated. The willingness of present claimants to elect class
action treatment in silicone gel cases'8 2 suggests that reasonable
minds may conclude that an overall settlement package best serves
their interests. Certainly claimants who presently show only pleural
thickening might similarly be satisfied with a settlement package like
the one presented in Philadelphia, which allows them compensation
by a simplified procedure should more serious complications arise.'8 3
But the reality is that this sort of particularized negotiation did not
occur.'
8 4
181 The settlement only forecloses suit in this country, not in the home country of the
foreign claimant. These foreign claimants face a substantial risk that their American suits
would be dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds, and they rarely have great litiga-
tion success at home thereafter. See generaly David Robinson, Forum Non Conveniens in
America and England: "A Rather Fantastic Fiction," 103 LQ. REv. 398 (1987). One may cavil
about this reality, but it provides a proper context for evaluating the claims that the foreign
claimants were unfairly deprived.
182 See infra notes 216-18 and accompanying text.
183 But here again state law can matter. In some states such people do not confront
difficulties under the single judgment rule. See supra note 27.
184 Even though it is the topic of a different part of this symposium, some mention of
ethical issues is in order here. Beyond providing separate representation for definable
groups, one might urge as well that class counsel be scrutinized under a demanding con-
flict of interest standard, which might prevent any lawyer who has current clients from
representing those with future claims. Whether or not this argument would work in indi-
vidua cases, it seems overblown in a class action. Indeed, in the asbestos litigation it may
have pernicious results. There is the risk that all experienced plaintiff's lawyers will be
disqualified, but clearly great familiarity with asbestos litigation issues was essential to effec-
tive representation in these cases.
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B. Settlement Classes
The preceding section pointed out the need for care regarding
the requirements for certification of a mass tort class action. This care
has sometimes been lacking, however, due to the practice of certifying
settlement classes, an increasingly popular device. Using this device
in the mass tort class action may magnify conflict and other
difficulties.
One difficulty can be avoided if the court at least selects and
deputizes class counsel. It has long been recognized that the defen-
dant may otherwise have an opportunity for lawyer-shopping. 8 5 This
problem can be solved if the court's approval is sought before the
lawyer purports to bind the class to even a tentative settlement. In
Georgine, however, this option was not taken, and the indifference dis-
played in that settlement to the distinctions among members of the
class may in part be due to that omission. 186
The more troubling question is whether the use of settlement
classes should be promoted in mass tort class actions. It is clear that
settlement classes have found increasing favor in the courts. The orig-
inal Manual for Complex Litigation counseled against allowing
them,18 7 but the Manual (Second)188 and the courts' 89 have taken a
more charitable view. Although strongly supportive of settlement
185 The Third Circuit stated:
[A] person who unofficially represents the class during settlement ne-
gotiations may be under strong pressure to conform to the defendants'
wishes. This is so because such an individual, lacking official status, knows
that a negotiating defendant may not like his "attitude" and may try to
reach a settlement with another member of the class .... Consequently
when the settlement is not negotiated by a court designated class represen-
tative the court must be doubly careful in evaluating the fairness of the
settlement to plaintiff's class.
Ace Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Crane Co., 458 F.2d 30, 33 (3d Cir. 1971).
186 It should be noted, however, that the plaintiffs' attorneys who negotiated with the
CCR were appointed lead counsel of the consolidated cases of current claimants combined
by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation. See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157
F.R.D. 246, 265-67 (E.D. Pa. 1994). They were not entirely without portfolio.
187 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LIIGATION § 1.46, 64-66 (1975).
188 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (SECOND) § 30.45, 242-43, 244 (1985).
189 See, e.g., In reA.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709, 738-40 (4th Cir. 1989) (approving of
the trial court's consideration of settlement in deciding to certify the class), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 959 (1989); Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61, 72-73 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 818 and 464 U.S. 818 (1983); In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 607 F.2d 167, 177-78
(5th Cir. 1979) (holding that under certain circumstances class certification to promote
settlement is in order), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905 (1981).
In Weinberger, the Second Circuit elaborated on the appeal of settlements that include
class certification:
The hallmark of Rule 23 is the flexibility it affords to the courts to
utilize the class device in a particular case to best serve the ends ofjustice
for the affected parties and to promote judicial efficiencies. Temporary
settlement classes have proved to be quite useful in resolving major class
action disputes. While their use may still be controversial, most courts have
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classes, Newberg recognizes that "[t] here is no doubt that the use of a
temporary settlement class tends to short-circuit the class certification
process if the class settlement is approved."' 90
There is a cogent argument for this short-circuiting since the
hard problems that the court would have to confront were the case to
go forward as an adjudicated class action can be avoided if the case is
settled. Indeed, the possibility that class action status might be denied
if the case is not settled can even be urged on the class members as a
reason for endorsing the settlement.' 91 Certainly it could be that the
challenges that ajoint trial would pose do not matter at the settlement
stage and therefore should not bear on settling the class action. But
shortcuts on class certification create a risk that the very disparities in
position that create potential conflicts will not receive sufficient atten-
tion. Determining whether common questions predominate calls for
the court to define what those questions are, and that analysis may
reveal that the class should be segregated into subclasses because
there are significant differences in the questions raised by claims of
the different groups. At bottom the vexing requirements of Rule 23
are meant to be just that; a method that invites the court to overlook
these requirements properly raises eyebrows.' 92 This is not to say that
recognized their utility and have authorized the parties to seek to compro-
mise their differences, including class action issues through this means.
698 F.2d at 72.
190 2 NEwBERG & CoNTE, supra note 116, §11.27 at 11-53.
191 Thus, in the Philadelphia asbestos class action the notice urged the following as a
reason favoring the settlement: "the possibility that this class action would not be certified
by the Court as a class action for any purpose other than settlement, which would mean
that class members would have to bring individual lawsuits to recover from the CCR de-
fendants." Notice of Rule 23(b) (3) Class Certification for Settlement Purposes Only, of
Proposed Settlement, and of Hearing on Proposed Settlement at 11, Carlough v. Amchem
Prods., Inc., 158 F.R.D. 314 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (No. 93-CV-0215).
192 Judge Reed in Georgine reasoned that "[a]mong the predominant issues in the set-
tlement context is whether a proposed settlement is fair, reasonable and adequate for the
class." Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 316 (E.D. Pa. 1994). This seems,
with all due respect, to be bootstrapping. The point is whether there are really common
questions that unite the class with regard to the claims made. Certainly Rule 23(b) (3)'s
predominance requirement calls for substantial attention to this point.
The judge did mention that class members had been exposed to asbestos products
and that "all share an interest in receiving prompt and fair compensation for their claims,
while minimizing the risks and transaction costs inherent in the asbestos litigation process
as it occurs presently in the tort system." Id. at 316; cf. Malcolm v. National Gypsum Co.,
995 F.2d 346 (2d Cir. 1993) (overturning order consolidating for trial claims of plaintiffs
exposed at 40 different power-generating stations). But predominance in the Philadelphia
class action was seemingly supplied only by the question of the adequacy of the settlement.
Judge Reed's side-stepping of the common questions issue as to the underlying claims
invited the court to indulge its substantive preferences about the rights of the parties with-
out focusing on how they might be in conflict.
As this Article went to press, the Third Circuit upheld the idea of a settlement class but
insisted that such a class satisfy the requisites for a class action. See In re General Motors
Corp. Pick-up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768 (3d Cir. 1995).
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a settlement cannot be negotiated before a full-dress class certification
decision, but it does mean that there should be more attention to
these problems before a settlement class strategy is adopted.
Among the recent settlements, Judge Parker's mandatory class ac-
tion under Rule 23(b) (1) (B) with regard to claims against Fibreboard
is the most striking instance of an aggressive pursuit of settlement in
seeming indifference to class certification requirements. As noted
above, 193 it is extremely difficult to understand how the requirements
of this provision can be satisfied in mass tort situations. But if they
were actually satisfied, there is no conceivable ground on which Rule
23(b) (1) (B) treatment would be appropriate only for settlement pur-
poses; the theory underlying that ground for class certification pre-
cludes opting out because class action treatment is mandatory, so
predominance of common questions is not required. As a conse-
quence, there seems no plausible argument for a Rule 23(b) (1) (B)
"settlement class," and one is tempted to conclude that Judge Parker
employed this portion of the rule because the settling parties insisted
on denying the right to opt out.
The counterweight to uneasiness about settlement classes is the
judicial policy in favor of settlement'194 This is no place to undertake
a full-dress examination of that policy, but in the class action context
the policy should be viewed with particular suspicion. Rule 23's start-
ing point regarding settlement is one of great skepticism-that the
parties cannot settle without permission from the court and notice to
the class. The rule therefore makes it evident that class settlements
are different from others. Outside the class action area, the policy in
favor of settlement usually looks to encouraging the parties them-
selves to settle, not appointing proxies to negotiate a settlement in
their absence. The very issues that raise questions about adequacy of
representation and conflicts-differences among members of the
class-also raise doubts about favoring this means of settling these
claims. Denying class action status in no way prevents the parties from
settling their cases, but they must do it by actual agreement rather
than in gross byjudicial fiat.
Moreover, as Professor Coffee points out,195 the settlement class
device exerts extreme pressure on class counsel to settle since it gives
this lawyer a commission only to settle and not to litigate. Given a
world in which plaintiffs' personal injury lawyers, or at least the ones
193 See supra text accompanying notes 102-17.
194 Newberg and Conte write that "it]he disadvantages accruing if the settlement is
disapproved are mostly outweighed, however, by the advantages arising from the general
policy of the judicial system to encourage and facilitate amicable settlements of litigation,
including class actions." 2 NEWBERG & CONTE, supra note 116, § 11.27, at 11-53.
195 See John G. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95
COLUM. L. REx,. (forthcoming October 1995).
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who specialize in mass tort cases, might be divided into the "settlers"
and the "fighters," judges may be tempted to pick pro-settlement law-
yers as class representatives in hopes thereby to further increase the
likelihood of settlement. 196 A settlement that is a sure thing, made
possible by a truncated class certification process, does not serve the
purposes of Rule 23.
At least in the securities and antitrust cases in which the settle-
ment class idea arose, a preference for class treatment might be found
in the 1966 revisions of Rule 23 and in the furthering of the underly-
ing policies of the federal claims being made. The policy in favor of
settlement in mass tort class actions seems linked to the substantive
goals of the federal courts in such cases.' 97 Settlement is attractive
because it caps the defendant's exposure, eliminates punitive dam-
ages, and defers claims until serious injury has occurred. But Rule 23
does not invite short cuts to achieve these objectives, and settlement
classes in mass tort class actions warrant more, not less, skepticism
than in other kinds of cases.
C. Scrutiny of Settlement Terms
The distinguishing feature of class action settlements is that the
judge must pass on the merits of a settlement after the participants
have negotiated it. Much as judges may influence the content of set-
tlements in other sorts of litigation by facilitating dealmaking by the
parties, this plenary veto power over the terms of the settlement is
nearly unique.' 98 But federal judges' substantive preferences in mass
tort litigation may tempt them to be less rigorous at the very time
when they should be most demanding.
Proper settlement review has both procedural and substantive as-
pects. The court should examine the way in which the settlement was
negotiated-the information available, the skill of the lawyers and the
manner in which the negotiations were conducted-to determine
whether the procedure appears calculated to lead to an appropriate
settlement. In the mass tort context, unlike the mass accident con-
text, a prime concern should be whether the litigation has become
what Professor McGovern labels "mature mass tort litigation."' 99 If
196 For discussion of assertions that judges may favor Stanley Chesley, a well-known
Ohio lawyer, due to his enthusiasm for settling class actions, see Alison Frankel, Et Tu,
Stan, AM. LAW., Jan./Feb. 1994, at 68.
197 See supra parts I and II.
198 The court has a similar role in regard to settlements of derivative actions for the
same reasons. See FED. R Civ. P. 23.1.
199 See Frances E. McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L. REv. 659
(1989). Judge Reed found that "the asbestos litigation was probably the most mature mass
tort litigation in this country." Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 267 (E.D.
Pa. 1994).
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not, claims that the settlement is adequate must be viewed with great
skepticism. Consider, for example, a hypothetical proposal for a class
action settlement of all future asbestos claims in 1977, when there
were some 103 such claims in the federal system.2 00 There would be
no way for a court to make a comfortable projection of the likely mag-
nitude or value of the claims being asserted. Perhaps similar misgiv-
ings should attend projections made now about future silicone gel
claims.20 1 Certainly the objections made in Silicone Gel on behalf of
foreign claimants suggest that, as to them, there was an insufficient
information base.202 In addition, there should be careful scrutiny of
any possible conflicts of interest, a topic covered above,203 in order to
minimize the risk that the interests of some are being sacrificed for
those of others.
Assuming the procedure is adequate, the court must also find
that the settlement itself is "fair, adequate and reasonable."20 4 This is
a merits review for the court, which is not even required to reject a
settlement opposed by a large portion of class members.20 5 But the
court's judgment should be based on what is fair and reasonable for
members of the class in view of the law governing the claims being
compromised, not something that strikes the judge as fair and reason-
able due to his or her substantive preferences about the underlying
law. As the differences in substantive position can be overlooked at
the conflict-identification stage, so might they be disregarded by
broad-brush treatment at the settlement-review stage. This orienta-
tion may be unusually tempting in mass tort litigation.
The correlation between the federal courts' emerging substantive
preferences and the terms of recent settlements suggests that such an
agenda underlies the fairness review. This suspicion is born out by the
200 That was the time the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation first refused to
transfer asbestos cases to a single district. See In re Asbestos and Asbestos Insulation Mate-
rial Prods. Liab. Litig., 431 F. Supp. 906 (J.P.M.L. 1977).
201 Indeed, while approving the settlementJudge Pointer noted that, although prior
cases regarding breast implants afforded a basis for predicting trial time and settlement
values, "they do not provide a reliable basis for any statistical extrapolation or prediction as
to outcomes of trials in the many different factual and legal settings these claims involve."
In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., CV 92-P-10000-S, CV 94-P-11558-S,
MDL NO. 926 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12521, at *4 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 1, 1994).
202 Id. at *8. Similar concerns might apply to a reported settlement of a class action
brought by hemophiliacs who contracted AIDS from blood transfusions. The settlement
would create a fund providing modest compensation for an undetermined number of
members of the class. Newspaper reports indicate no "track record" upon which the
amount of the fund was based. Thomas M. Burton & G. Pascal Zachary, Pact Reached in
Hemophiliac AIDS Suits, WALL ST. J., Aug. 3, 1994, at B7.
203 See supra text accompanying notes 177-84.
204 Cotton v. Hinton, 559 F.2d 1326, 1330 (5th Cir. 1977).
205 See TBK Parmers, Ltd. v. Western Union Corp., 675 F.2d 456, 462-63 (2d Cir. 1982)
(majority rule not "litmus test" but "significant," particularly where dispute centers on suffi-
ciency of settlement fund).
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treatment of pleural claims, which the asbestos settlement prohibited
except in instances of considerable impairment, even though class
members without such impairment may have had highly valuable
claims under the law of some states. Rather than confine the inquiry
to arguments about a trade-off of uncertain current recoveries for
pleural claimants in return for future compensation should the condi-
tion worsen, and confront the serious problems these class members
might face if they were at the back of a very long queue,20 6 the judge
treated the sacrifice of their claims as sensible in the context of an
overall package that was "fair" to all.2o7 In part, this reflects the failure
to identify these class members' position as sufficiently separate tojus-
tify subclassing. But beyond that, the judge's views appear driven by
the widely-shared (and extremely plausible) view that claims by others
who had sustained more serious injury should take priority over pleu-
ral claims, regardless of the applicable tort law.208 For the judge to
approve the dilution of the legal rights of certain class members be-
206 The judge did address these items:
This Court finds that the group of benefits offered to non-impaired
class members has significant value. Non-impaired class members will no
longer be forced to file premature lawsuits or risk their claims being time-
barred. Second, if and when class members do become sick, they will not
have to suffer the uncertainties, long delays, and high transaction costs of
the tort system. Third, the waiver of defenses under the Stipulation is a
significant benefit because there are approximately a dozen CCR defend-
ants who have, to date, been held not liable under negligence or strict lia-
bility principles in an asbestos case .... Finally, under the Stipulation,
qualifying claimants with a non-malignant condition do not have to chose
between filing now or waiting to see if they develop a more serious malig-
nant condition. This is in marked contrast to the current tort system,
where non-impaired claimants usually settle their claims for small amounts
and a full release of all claims for any future asbestos-related injury, includ-
ing cancer.
Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 FR.D. 246, 292 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (citations omitted).
207 He explained that he "considered this issue in the context of the overall fairness
and reasonableness of the compromise struck by the Settling Parties in the agreement."
Georgine, 157 F.1.D. at 272. In this context, he based the conclusion in part on a finding
that pleural changes "will in the vast majority of cases cause no symptoms" and "will not
have any effect on the individual's life span." Id. at 273. But that is not the question, since
if these people have substantial claims under state law the court should not reject them as a
bad idea. This is the Erie problem. It also seems that the court's treatment of these claims,
quoted above, is hard to square with a different finding-
The Objectors have also argued that the benefits offered non-impaired
claimants under the Stipulation are not meaningful because few, if any, of
these claimants will become sick and qualify for cash compensation. The
Court credits the uncontradicted testimony of two medical experts in find-
ing that currently non-impaired claimants are likely to develop more seri-
ous asbestos-related medical conditions, such as lung cancer or
mesothelioma.
Id. at 293. This finding seems to hold the germ of a basis for finding the settlement fair to
these claimants because it assures them of a remedy if they do become seriously ill.
208 See Peter H. Schuck, The Worst Should Go First: Deferral Registries in Asbestos Litigation,
15 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 541 (1992) (arguing for creation of registry and allowing suits
to go on docket only when actual impairment is shown).
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cause he disfavors those rights in comparison to the rights of others
undermines the substantive review of the settlement package. Yet with
tort reform as a seeming goal, this may be an irresistible temptation.
V
SOME POSITIVE REFLECTIONS ON CLASS ACTION TORT
REFORM
Nearly twenty years ago, Professor Chayes concluded his examina-
tion ofjudges' behavior in public law litigation with a "first appraisal"
that was sympathetic despite the difficulties of fitting these cases into
accepted doctrines ofjudicial behavior.20 9 In 1987, I concluded from
a review of the Agent Orange class action that it raised a specter of a
"procedural apocalypse."210 Although there are multiple reasons for
fearing that these cases show that this apocalypse is upon us, in fair-
ness there are also reasons to adopt a more charitable attitude like
that of Professor Chayes.
First, the recent settlements, particularly the asbestos cases, are
hardly business as usual for the federal courts.2 1 ' They address a seri-
ous problem of judicial overload and litigant delay that has plagued
judges and plaintiffs for some time. Assurances that the problem at
hand is unique212 must be taken with a grain of salt. Nevertheless, it is
reassuring that the innovators are not saying that they can supplant
the conventional tort system more generally or that class actions
should routinely be used to intercept prospective mass tort litigation
outbreaks. Accordingly, the systemic concerns that underlie the Erie-
based objection may be largely academic. Indeed, even state courts
have expressed frustration at their own inability to solve the punitive
damages problem in asbestos litigation. Thus, the New Jersey
Supreme Court observed that "[a] t the state court level we are power-
less to implement solutions to the nationwide problems created by
asbestos exposure and litigation arising from that exposure." 21 3 The
federal solution may be welcomed by many, if not all, state benches.
209 Abram Chayes, The Role of theJudge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HIARv. L. REv. 1281,
1304-09 (1976).
210 Richard L. Marcus, Apocalypse Now?, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1267, 1284-95 (1987).
211 This does not mean that they could not become commonplace. Indeed, Professor
Coffee's examples of other recent class action settlements suggestjust such a risk, although
mostly in state courts. See Coffee, supra note 195. For the state courts to undertake such
enterprises raises obstacles that do not attend an effort by a federal court.
212 E.g., Dunn v. Hovic, 1 F.3d 1371, 1393 (3d Cir. 1993) (Weis, J., dissenting) ("Asbes-
tos litigation is unique.").
213 Fischer v. Johns-Manville Corp., 512 A.2d 466, 480 (NJ. 1986). In a similar vein,
the Supreme Court of West Virginia recognized that "because asbestos trials are held na-
tionwide, it is doubtful that one state's ruling would necessarily bind other jurisdictions."
Davis v. Celotex Corp., 420 S.E.2d 557, 566 (W. Va. 1992).
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Second, despite some strident objections to the settlements, there
is some ground for hope that the new regimes will prove to be a boon
for many claimants.214 During the opt-out period in the Silicone Gel
litigation, a new study was published indicating that there is no link
between implants and diseases.215 Accordingly, those claimants who
exhibit conditions entitling them to substantial compensation under
the settlement may be considerably better off than they would be pur-
suing tort suits. Indeed, Judge Pointer was able to observe, in approv-
ing the settlement in that case, that "virtually all domestic class
members... want the settlement to be approved, and without de-
lay."2 1 6 Moreover, the gadfly involvement of victims' support groups,
particularly in the Silicone Gel litigation,21 7 may have helped keep the
process honest. The reported willingness of a large proportion of Sili-
cone Gel class members with suits on file to remain in the class218 also
showed that this alternative to the conventional tort system did have
significant appeal to claimants most likely to be familiar with the ac-
214 A related concern, not explored here, is that inherently weak claims might,
through the class action, acquire substantial settlement value. For example, as pointed out
infra note 215, it may be that the silicone gel claims ultimately do not have much merit.
For the courts to create a device by which the defendants pay billions for nearly worthless
claims would be dubious, to put it mildly. At least in the securities fraud area, there is
some reason to fear that has happened. SeeJanet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter?
A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L REv. 497 (1991). But there are
also grounds for doubting the problem is widespread. See Joel Seligman, The Merits Do
Matter, 108 HARv. L. REv. 438 (1994) (questioning Alexander's methodology and
conclusions).
215 See Gina Kolata, Study Finds No Implant-Disease Links, N.Y. TIMES,June 16, 1994, at A8
(describing study by doctor at Mayo Clinic published in New EnglandJournal of Medicine).
Particularly given the timing, this study was received with considerable skepticism by some
plaintiffs' attorneys. One Texas lawyer sought to depose the executive editor of the New
England Journal of Medicine to investigate the possibility that the timing of the publication
was designed to frighten women into remaining in the class. See Mike McKee, Timing is
Everything, RECORDER, July 8, 1994, at 1. For reports of later studies finding no association
between silicone gel implants and certain disorders, see PhilipJ. Hilts, Two Studies Find No
Breast-Implant Tie to Connective-Tissue Illness, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1994, at A23.
216 In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., Nos. CV92-P-10000-S, CV94-P-
11588-S, MDL No. 926 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12521, at *14 (N.D. Ala., Sept. 1, 1994).
Recent reports indicate, however, that the settlement may be underfunded to cover cur-
rent claims. SeeThomas M. Burton, Implant Fund Too Small to Cover Claims, WALL ST. J., May
2, 1995, at A3. On May 15, 1995, Dow Coming filed a Chapter 11 petition possibly under-
cutting the pact. See Milo Geyelin, Dow Coming Seeks Chapter 11 Shield Clouding Status of
Breast-Implant Pact, WALL ST.J., May 16, 1995, at AS.
217 See Nina Martin, As Constituents Charge Exclusivity, It's Clear Leaders Aren't Always
Loved, S.F. DAILYJ., May 19, 1994, at 1 (describing Command Trust Network, which not
only attended court hearings but also meetings of plaintiffs' steering committee, and re-
porting that the group helped to persuade Judge Sam Pointer to alter provisions of the
compensation program).
218 In the California state court system, "[t]he vast majority of Superior Court plain-
tiffs-there were nearly 3,000 cases filed-opted to participate in a global settlement."
Lauren Blau, Implant Maker Knew of Risk of Silicone, Sufferer Contends, S.F. DAMYJ., July 29,
1994, at 3. Another article reported that plaintiffs in all but 250 cases chose to accept the
settlement's program and described the reaction of one plaintiffs' attorney:
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tual operation of the judicial system. We must not forget that the real-
ity for many tort litigants bears only a faint resemblance to the ideal
that we endorse in theory, particularly in mass tort litigation.21 9 For
many, the settlements have opened up an attractive new avenue for
recourse. At the same time, the number of opt outs, while raising
concerns about the adequacy of the settlement package, also suggests
that the notice programs were not entirely ineffective. 220 At least a
significant number of those who preferred to preserve the right to sue
will be able to do so.
Third, precluding use of class actions would not end procedural
innovation, and attendant possible impact on substantive rights, in
mass tort litigation. Consolidation and other techniques frequently
result in the streamlining of mass tort litigation.221 Indeed, the Amer-
ican Law Institute's Complex Litigation Project eventually decided not
to emphasize class actions but rather to focus on consolidation in
their proposal for dealing with mass tort cases and focused instead on
consolidation. 222
Fourth, the settlements afford an opportunity to observe experi-
mental uses of various potential features of tort reform, providing ex-
perience from which to evaluate pending proposals for broader
alternatives to tort litigation. The creation of a matrix for compensa-
tion based on results of litigated and settled cases, although not un-
precedented, offers one model on how simplified compensation
[The attorney] was originally skeptical of the settlement's worth in
terms of providing fair compensation for his clients, but ultimately saw all
but 20 of his 130 clients register to join.
"Why did my clients register?" he said. "A lot of them do not want to
have to go through the rigors of discovery and deposition-maintaining
privacy is important to them. Others are intimidated by the legal system.
Some are just pragmatic and think that if the global settlement pays off
near where it's supposed to, that's the best way to go."
Ashley Craddock, Feared Implant Gridlock Now Seems Unlikely, With Accord in Offing, S.F. DAILY
J., Aug. 18, 1994, at 1.
219 See Deborah R. Hensler, Resolving Mass Toxic Torts: Myths and Realities, 1989 U. ILL
L. REv. 89, 92-100.
220 Some 235,000 people reportedly opted out of the Philadelphia asbestos litigation.
Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 325 (E.D. Pa. 1994). This represents
approximately as many people as have filed asbestos personal injury suits over the past
decade. Concerned that many of these class members were stampeded into opting out by
attorneys who objected to the settlement, the court invalidated the opt outs and allowed a
new opt-out period. Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., Civ. A. No. 93-0215, 1995 WL 90157
(E.D. Pa. Mar. 1, 1995). In the breast implant litigation, approximately 15,000 opt outs
were received. See Surprising Number Reject Breast Implant Settlement, S.F. CHRON., July 29,
1994, at A7.
221 E.g., In re Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 1988) (consolidated trial of
claims of over 1,100 plaintiffs applying Ohio law pursuant to stipulation of parties), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 1006 (1989).
222 See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, COMPLEX LIIGATIoN PROJEcr Chapters 3, 4, & 5
(1994) (proposing consolidation to deal with mass tort litigation).
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schemes might be developed. The development of an extraordinary
claim procedure to deviate from the matrix in exceptional cases might
be a desirable feature if administratively feasible. "Choice of law" pro-
visions that tailor the compensation with an eye to governing state law
may offer a method for fair national solutions. Compensation criteria
that mimic tort standards similarly may offer reassurance to those con-
cerned about the draconian effect of such compensation schemes.
The inclusion of opportunities to go to court later-a sort of rear-end
opt-out opportunity-also might prove a desirable innovation. The
effectiveness of the differing methods of ensuring the fiscal health of
the compensation funds may provide useful insights into how com-
pensation schemes could be fairly and prudently financed. If Erie en-
ables the states to serve as laboratories for experimentation in new
legal regimes, these settlements might provide an experiment from
which the states (and Congress) might learn.
CONCLUSION
Perhaps the class action is, after all, a Phoenix rather than a dino-
saur.2 23 Before we embrace it as the deus ex machina for the mass tort
problem, however, a number of serious obstacles must be sur-
mounted. If this Article is right, it is not categorically forbidden to try
to accomplish the sorts of objectives these settlements seek. But Rule
23 is not a warrant for tort reform in federal court to cure "defects" in
state tort law, and the substitution of a new compensation regime
should depend on notice and an opportunity to opt out that truly
affords class members a chance to vote. Circumventing that by invok-
ing "equitable jurisdiction" or relying on mandatory class action treat-
ment should not fill the void in judicial authority. Accordingly, some
of the recent settlements appear subject to serious criticism for failing
adequately to ensure a real opportunity to choose whether to accept
the negotiated solution. So also do some seem to gloss over serious
conflicts, weaken class certification requirements by use of the "settle-
ment class" technique, and shirk the hard review that should follow
from acceptance and evaluation of the substantial rights of the class
members.
The explanation for these short cuts is that federal judges under-
standably react with impatience to the shortcomings of state tort law
in mass tort litigation, and perceive that no other governmental insti-
tution is capably dealing with these problems. Although there may be
extraordinary situations warranting judicial action to solve such im-
passes in the other branches, 224 it is hard to believe that this is a com-
223 Cf Arthur K Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix, 69 MiN. L. REv. 1
(1984).
224 Cf Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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parable situation. For the courts to generalize from the experience in
the asbestos and silicone gel cases tojustify broader-gauged "improve-
ment" on state law could indeed have apocalyptic consequences. But
that probably will not happen, and the recent settlements may be ap-
plauded if their handiwork survives appellate review.
